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ENDÜSTRĐYEL PATLAMALARIN MODELLENMESĐ;  
ÖZEL DURUM LPG PATLAMASI 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
Bu çalışmada endüstride en sık karşılaşılan iki patlama türü yer almaktadır. Bunlar 
gaz ve toz patlamalarıdır. Toz patlamaları ile ilgili, tarihte meydana gelen toz 
patlamaları, toz patlama beşgeni, toz patlamalarını tetikleyen etkenler, birincil ve 
ikincil toz patlamaları, toz patlama mekanizması ve toz patlama şiddetini etkileyen 
faktörler  özetlenmiştir. Sonraki bölümde gaz patlamaları açıklandı. Gaz patlamaları 
meydana gelidği yere göre üç grup altında; sınırlı gaz patlamaları, kısmi sınırlı gaz 
patlamaları ve kışatılmamış gaz patlamaları olarak sınıflandırılır. Sınırlı gaz 
patlamaları, kısmi sınırlı gaz patlamaları ve kışatılmamış gaz patlamalarından sonra 
BLEVE olayı açıklandı. Üç buhar bulutu yayılım modeli olan; yoğun gaz yayılımı, 
pasif gaz yayılımı ve jet modelleri hakkında bilgiler veridi. Ayrıca mevcut gaz 
patlama modelleri incelenerek, bunların zayıf ve güçlü noktaları özetlendi. Đncelenen 
gaz patlama modelleri sırası ile amprik modeller, fenomen modeller, CFD modelleri 
ve gelişmiş CFD modelleridir. Yine aynı bölümde mevcut gaz modelleme yazılımları 
özetlenmiştir. Uygulama bölümünde bir LPG dolum tesisinde meydana gelebilecek 
çeşitli kaza ve patlama senaryoları modellendi, ayrıca ĐTÜ Maslak kampüsünde 
bulunan LPG tankın kaza ve patlama senaryosu için modelleme yapıldı. Her bir 
senaryo için önce tank’tan bir sızıntı olduğu ve gazın alev almadığı kabul edilerek, 
zehirli alan, yanma alan ve patlama alanları modellendi, sonra tankta sızıntı olduğu 
ve alev aldığı kabul edilerek jet yanması modellendi, son olarak tank için BLEVE 
olayı modellendi. Modelleme için ALOHA programı kullanılmıştır. Son bölümde 
endüstride patlama modellemelerinin kullanılmasının sağladığı faydalar ve bundan 
sonraki çalışmalar için bilgiler verildi. 
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INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIONS MODELLING;   
SPECIAL CASE AN LPG EXPLOSION 
 
               
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this study the two main hazards in industry are discussed; gas explosions and dust 
explosions. In the first part dust explosion case history, the dust explosion pentagon, 
what triggers dust explosions, primary and secondary dust explosions, dust explosion 
mechanism, and the dust explosability factors are summarized. In the next part the 
gas explosions are presented. Regarding the environment where gas explosions 
occur, gas explosions are classified as confined gas explosions, partially confined gas 
explosions, and unconfined gas explosions. After these three types of explosions, 
BLEVE is explained. Then, the three types of vapour cloud dispersion model which 
are dense gas dispersion, passive dispersion, and jet and plume rise models are 
presented. The current gas explosion models which are empirical models, 
phenomenological models, CFD models and advanced CFD models are summarised 
with their strong and weak points. Modelling software is presented. An experimental 
study was done at the LPG filling station and LPG storage tank at the ĐTÜ Maslak 
campus.  The experimental chapter contains different simulation scenarios for failure 
and explosion of LPG tanks. For each scenario first it is assumed that there is a leak 
from a tank and there is no fire and toxic area of a vapour cloud, flammable area of a 
vapour cloud and blast area of a vapour cloud explosion is simulated. Next, it is 
assumed that there is a leak from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. Finally, it is 
assumed that BLEVE occurs, the tank explodes and the chemical burns in a fireball. 
Modelling was done by ALOHA program. Last chapter contains advantages of using 
explosion modelling in industry and recommendation for future work. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety has always been an important consideration in industry. In recent years, 
environmental issues, public risk and opinion have made the analysis of plant 
accidents more important. In consequence more attention has been focused on the 
ability to model potential process accidents and determine what consequences could 
reasonably be expected if the potential event should occur. Most dangerous failures 
are explosions.  
 There are many types of explosions, but in industry, generally, dust and gas 
explosions are the most common. In the past there were many catastrophic dust and 
gas explosions. The primary focus of this work is on the modelling of industrial 
explosions, especially gas explosions.  
In the second chapter dust explosion and case history, the dust explosion pentagon, 
what triggers dust explosions, dust explosion mechanism, primary and secondary 
dust explosion and dust explosion factors are summarized. 
In the third chapter, first confined, partially confined, unconfined gas explosions and 
BLEVE are summarized. Existing vapour cloud models are examined. Empirical, 
phenomenological, CFD and advanced CFD gas explosion models are summarized 
for their weaknesses and strengths. Then, modelling software is summarized.  
In the experimental chapter, a simulation and risk determination from the LPG filling 
station and storage tank at ĐTÜ was done using the ALOHA program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
2. DUST EXPLOSIONS 
 
NFPA define “dust” as a finely divided solid, 420µm or less in diameter, according 
to the BS 2955:1958; materials with a particle size of less than 1000µm are defined 
as “powder”; while particles having diameter of less than 76 µm are defined as 
“dust” [1-3].  
There are nearly six order difference between NFPA 68 and BS 2955; it is preferable 
to follow the Palmer view that does not exclude particle diameters coarser than 1000 
µm [2-4]. In this thesis the term “dust” is used for all particulate material, regardless 
of particle size. 
While in process industry more than %70 of dust is combustible, it is clear that a big 
part of industrial plants have dust processing equipment which has potential risks [5]. 
Dust explosion is the rapid combustion of a flammable cloud consisting of dust 
particles and air.  
2.1 Dust Explosion Case History 
Although dust explosions have been found in literature since 1785 [6,7], regular 
recording started at the beginning of the 20th century. A dust explosion occurred in a 
corn processing plant in Iowa in the USA and killed 43 people. This explosion 
occurred in 1919. Another dust explosion occurred in a similar plant in Illinois in the 
USA in 1924 and 42 people were killed [5]. 
A dust explosion at a big export grain silo plant at Christi in the USA in 1981 killed 
9 personnel and injured 30 people. The material loss was estimated at about $30 
million [8]. 
March 15, 1987 in China at the Harbin Linen Textile Plant the ignition of an 
electrostatic spark in one oh the dust collecting units caused a dust explosion. After 
 3 
that 7 other dust collecting units were affected and 13,000m2 of factory area was 
destroyed, 58 personnel died and 177 personnel were injured [9,10]. 
The illegal storage of large quantise of dry BPO (benzoylperoxide) caused another 
catastrophic explosion. In August, 1990, in Japan dry BPO exploded at a BPO 
manufacturing plant of the Dai-ichi Kasei Kogyo Company. In June, 1992, by the 
ignition of a powder mixture of potassium chlorate and aluminium during a mixing 
operation, a dust explosion was caused at the Daido Kako Enka Firework 
manufacturing factory in Moriya in Japan where 3 personnel died and 58 were 
injured [11]. 
One of the most expensive industrial accidents in the history of the US was an 
explosion in a powerhouse of the Ford Motor Company in Michigan on February 1st  
in 1999 where 6 workers died, 14 were injured and the cost was over $1 billion. The 
primary explosion was caused due to a natural gas build-up in a boiler that was being 
isolated. It has been suggested that the result of a secondary dust explosion caused 
the main damage which was a powerhouse building and connected facilities [12]. 
There are many dust explosion records for developed countries, but for developing 
countries there is not much information. In third world countries chemical industry 
accidents are mainly focused on toxic release, for example, in Bhopal in 1984 
[13,14]. For process industry accidents, vapour cloud explosions, BLEVE, pool fires, 
flash fires and fireballs are the most heard of events [15-16]. In contrast; the dust 
explosion is less known in third world countries. For example, India is a country 
which has advanced technology. But, in India, dust explosions are almost non-
existent [17]. In many cases, accidents are reported as explosions; the type of 
explosion is not recorded.  
2.2 Dust Explosion Pentagon  
When three factors, fuel, oxidant, and ignition come together, fire is caused and it is 
called the fire triangle. If any of the elements is removed, the possibility for fire is 
eliminated [18]. 
 
 4 
 
Figure 1.1 :   Classic Fire Triangle [18] 
 
A dust explosion requires two additional elements, mixing and confinement, and 
these five factors form the “dust explosion pentagon”; if mixing or confinement is 
removed from the environment a fire can continue, but an explosion will be 
prevented [18]. 
 
  
Figure 1.2 :   The Dust Explosion Pentagon [18] 
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2.3 What Triggers Dust Explosions 
There are many causes which trigger dust explosions. Some of these causes are listed 
below. 
2.3.1 Flames and direct heat 
Flames and direct heat are very dangerous for all kind of explosions. If there is a risk, 
direct heat should be replaced by indirect heating. For example, heating can be done 
by circulating hot water or steam through pipes, or a hot water bath can be used [18]. 
2.3.2 Hot work 
There are some operations that generate excessive heat, for example, welding and 
cutting. If there is such an operation, extra safety measures should apply. If 
equipment used for this operation is not cleaned, there is a high risk of explosion 
[18]. 
2.3.2 Incandescent material 
Incandescent materials are also dangerous and can trigger a dust explosion inside 
equipment. For example, direct firing systems are potential sources of incandescent 
particles [18]. 
2.3.4 Hot surfaces 
Equipment with a hot surface also triggers dust explosions. For example, steam 
pipes, electric lamps and distressed bearings. If the surface temperature of the 
equipment is between 100 and 200 oC this may cause ignition of the dust layer [18].  
2.3.5 Sparks 
Electrostatic sparks 
The electrostatic discharge from any equipment can cause a spark which can ignite a 
dust cloud.  
Electrical sparks 
In the normal operation of switches and relays in malfunctioning electrical 
equipment it is possible to form a spark.  
 Friction sparks and hot spots; Generally frictional sparks occur during the rubbing 
of one solid with another or during grinding. 
Impact sparks; Impact sparks can be created by hand tools [18].  
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2.3.6 Self-heating 
Many reactions contribute to self-heating which is another risk for dust explosions. 
During process and storage temperature of dust should be controlled. The tendency 
of dust to self-heating should be analyzed. 
2.3.7 Static electricity 
Static electricity is another cause for triggering a dust explosion. According to 
Matsuda, 25.7% of the dust explosions recorded in Japan between 1952 and 1990 
were triggered by static electricity [19]. 
The ignition of a dust cloud by static electricity is effected by particle size 
distribution and the duration and rate of the application of ignition energy [20].  
2.3.8 Lightning 
Lightening can trigger a dust explosion. 
2.3.8 Shock waves 
 
Shock waves can trigger a dust explosion 
 
Table 2.1 :   Major dust explosion triggers [18] 
Proportion found responsible (%) 
Ignition source Primary                   Elevator                      Feed mills 
Explosion                incidents            
Welding and cutting 
Fire 
Friction 
Electrical 
Lightening 
Static electricity 
Unknown 
10 
7.8 
8.5 
4.3 
2.8 
4.5 
60 
24.3 
NRA 
NRA 
6.0 
1.5 
1.5 
25.7 
12 
12 
4 
4 
NRA 
NRA 
34 
NRA: no record available 
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2.4 Primary and Secondary Dust Explosions  
Primary dust explosions take place when a dust suspension in a container, room, 
mill, mixer, dryer, cyclone, hopper or piece of equipment is ignited and explodes.  
The explosion at the Hayes Lemmerz is a good example of a primary dust explosion 
[21]. 
It is important to reduce the possibility of a primary explosion to prevent other 
explosions, which will continue if there are the proper conditions. 
Secondary explosions occur when accumulated dust on any surface is ignited by a 
primary explosion. Often secondary dust explosions are more violent than primary 
explosions. A weak primary dust explosion may cause a very violent secondary dust 
explosion [21]. 
Sometimes secondary dust explosions are ignited by different explosions, not 
primary dust explosions. For example the dust explosion at CTA Acoustics, West 
Pharmaceutical Services, and Ford River Rouge were secondary dust explosions 
which were not ignited by dust explosions [21]. 
To minimize the risks for secondary dust explosions, dust accumulation should be 
minimized, only an approved vacuum cleaner should be used, proper cleaning 
procedures should be used, the proper design of areas in which there is dust and dust 
collectors should be used [21]. 
2.5 Dust Explosion Mechanism 
By a combination of 5 factors, dust cloud, ignition source, oxidant, confinement and 
the mixing of air and a dust cloud, dust explosions occur. The rate and range of flame 
expansion depends on many factors some of them are an ambient condition, the 
nature of the dust, dust particle size and shape, by-products. The dust explosion is a 
complicated phenomenon which includes simultaneous momentum, energy and mass 
transport in a reactive multi-phase system [22]. 
2.5.1 Dust explosability factors  
There are many factors which affect dust explosability. According to such factors the 
violence of explosions increases or decreases. Some of the factors are described 
below. 
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Particle size 
Dust with finer particles has a larger surface area in relation to their weight and 
rapidly react with oxygen when mixed in air and ignite; also, these are more 
explosive. 
The explosability of dust depends on surface area but it does not vary linearly. Also 
the actual speed of combustion and concentration are very important. 
Dust concentration 
For a dust explosion to occur dust concentration should be at certain limits. 
Generally, the limits are: 
50-100 g/m3: lowest concentration 
2-3 kg/m3: maximum concentration 
Oxidant concentration 
Another part of the pentagon is an oxidant. Generally, an oxidant is the oxygen in the 
air. If the concentration of oxygen in the air is greater than %21 it tends to increase 
the burning velocity of the fuel; otherwise, if concentration is less than %21, the 
burning velocity is reduced [18]. 
Ignition temperature 
The lowest temperature at which ignition occurs is called the minimum ignition 
temperature (MIT). MIT increases with the presence of moisture or other inreactants 
in the dust cloud, and decreases with decreasing particle size [18]. 
Turbulence of the dust cloud 
There are two types of turbulence. First is generated by dust production operations; 
for example, mixers, bag filters air and jet mills. The second type is generated during 
the combustion process after the dust cloud ignites. If the dust cloud has high degree 
of turbulence, a flame will ignite very quickly and this will result in a violent 
explosion. The turbulence affects the rate of pressure rise much more than the peak 
pressure [18]. 
Maximum rate of pressure rise 
Regarding the classical combustion theory for ideal gases case, the absolute pressure 
is a function of time P(t); in a constant volume a spherical explosion  is related with 
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the fractional volume, V(t), possessed by a fireball during the time of propagation, t,  
as in the following equation [18]. 
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P0 – initial absolute pressure 
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Bartknecht and Wiemann found that Pmax increases linearly with an increase in initial 
pressure over the 1 – 4 bar range and Kst increases linearly with initial pressure [18]. 
Admixed inert dust concentration 
Flammability curves can be created for fuel /inert dust mixtures. The flammability 
curve for dust is similar to gas curves and is characterized by a lower flammable 
limit, an upper flammable limit and a minimum inerting concentration. 
Presence of flammable gases 
If there is a flammable gas in dust explosabilitiy is increased. Also, if there is a gas in 
the dust the minimum ignition energy will be lower compared to pure dust. 
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3. GAS EXPLOSIONS 
 
Industrial gas explosions are not common, but are very dangerous. These kind of 
explosions have a big impact on human life, industrial plants, residential areas and 
the environment.  
A gas explosion is defined as a process wherein the combustion of a premixed cloud 
i.e. fuel-air or fuel- oxidizer, is causing a rapid increase of pressure [23]. 
On June 1st, 1974 in the Nypro plant at Flixborough one of the most dangerous 
explosions of the chemical industry occurred. In the explosion, 28 people were 
killed, 36 were injured and the plant was totally destroyed. The explosion caused 
serious effects outside the plant, 53 people injured, 1821 houses and 167 shops 
damaged. The cost of damage was over $100 mil. The reason of explosion was the 
release of nearly 50 tons of cyclohexane. A flammable cloud occurred and after 1 
minute or so this cloud ignited and a violent explosion occurred with a blast equal to 
nearly 16 tons of TNT [23]. 
Chemical plants contain a high hazard potential. As is seen in Table 3.1 and Table 
3.1 major accidents are explosions, fires and the dispersion of toxic chemicals. 
Vapour cloud explosions (VCE) are the most common, most destructive and 
dangerous. Also economic loss is high for explosions [24]. 
Table 3.1:  Types of loss for large chemical accidents [24] 
Type Percentage 
Vapour cloud explosion %42 
Fires %35 
Explosion, other %22 
Wind %1 
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Table 3.2:  Three types of chemical plant accidents [24] 
Type Probability of  
occurrence 
Potential for 
fatalities 
Potential for 
economic loss 
Fire High Low Intermediate 
Explosion High Intermediate High 
Toxic Release Low High Low 
 
 
Deflagration is described as a combustion wave propagating at a subsonic velocity 
relative to the unburnt gas immediately ahead of the flame. Flame speed varies 
between 1 m/s and 500 – 1000 m/s and the explosion pressure can be a few mbar or 
several bar. Detonation is described as a combustion wave propagating at a 
supersonic velocity relative to the unburnt gas immediately ahead of the flame. For 
fuel –air mixtures at ambient pressure flame speed can be as large as 2000 m/s and 
maximum pressure can be as large as 20 bar [23].    
Regarding the environment where gas explosions occur there are classifications. In 
some sources, gas explosions are grouped in two classes: confined or unconfined.   
From another source, gas explosions are separated into three classes regarding the 
environment. The first class is a confined gas explosion which takes place in pipes, 
vessels, tunnels or channels. The second class is a partly confined gas explosion 
which takes place in buildings, compartments and offshore modules. The third class 
is an unconfined gas explosion. These kinds of explosions occur in process industry 
and other unconfined areas [23]. 
Table 3.3 Type of accidents [25] 
Year Fire Explosion Spill Toxic gas Release Misc. Total 
1960-1969 8 8 0 0 1a 17 
1970-1979 26 5 5 0  36 
1980-1989 31 16 3 2 1a 53 
1990-1999 59 22 2 1 1b 85 
2000-2003 21 10 8 10 2c 51 
Subtotal 145 61 18 13 5 242 
a Tank body distortion 
b
 Personal fall 
c
 1 personnel fell and 1 personnel electrified o death. 
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Table 3.4: Type of tank contents [25] 
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1960-1969 6 3 0 3 3 2 0    17 
1970-1979 8 7 13 3 3 2 0    36 
1980-1989 17 14 17 4 1 0 0    53 
1990-1999 23 19 21 11 5 4 0 1  1 85 
2000-2003 12 16 6 6 1 1 3 2 3 1 51 
Subtotal 66 59 55 27 1
5 
9 3 3 3 2 242 
a
 Fuel oil, diesel, kerosene, lubricants. 
b
 Propane and butane included. 
Generally storage tanks in industry contain flammable and hazardous materials. In 
Table 3.3 there is data about the type of accident in 242 tank accidents occurring in 
the last 40 years. As indicated, fire is the most frequent type of loss; then explosion. 
Fire and explosion together constitute %85 of total accidents. From Table 3.4 can be 
seen that storage tanks which contain LPG are in 5th place after crude oil, oil 
products, gasoline and petrochemicals. There are many types of causes for accidents. 
The most frequent is lightning, the second is maintenance error, and the others are 
operational errors, equipment failures, sabotage, cracks and ruptures, leaks and line 
ruptures, static electricity, open flames, natural disaster and runaway reactions [25]. 
3.1 Confined Gas Explosions 
Explosions which occur in pipes, process equipment, culverts, sewage systems 
closed rooms and an underground installations are called confined gas explosions 
and also internal explosions. In this explosion the combustion process does not need 
to be fast to cause big problems [23]. 
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Figure 3.1:   Confined Explosion within a Tank [23] 
Gas explosions in vessels, pipes, channels and tunnels 
In a confined explosion a gas cloud’s size is the main parameter determining pressure 
build-up.  For example, inside equipment if a big cloud is formed and then ignited 
the result there will be a severe explosion. In result of internal explosion will be a 
loss and the subsequent effect can be strong blast waves from high pressure 
reservoirs, fires, or toxic releases [23]. 
Closed Vessels 
Generally, during a gas explosion, a closed vessel, to relieve pressure has a small 
opening like connected pipes, rupture disks or relief valves. Because the openings are 
small relief process is very slow and the pressure is relieved slowly and the vessel 
may behave as a fully closed system regarding a pressure build up. In these systems a 
pressure build up depends on fuel type and concentration, the initial pressure, the 
filling ratio, the burning rate, venting and the oxidizer [23]. 
 
Figure 3.2 :   Explosion in a Closed Vessel [23] 
 
For a slow deflagration homogeneous gas mixture, the pressure in the vessel will 
gradually increase as the flame consumes the gas mixture. In Figure 3.2 the 
maximum pressure is easily reached when the combustion is completed [23].  
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Figure 3.3 :   Explosion Pressure Predicted By Stanjan for a Constant Volume Of 
Ethylene And Methane-Air At 1 Bar And 25 oC [23] 
Figure 3.3 shows the pressure for constant volume combustion as the function of a 
fuel ratio of homogeneous methane and ethylene air mixtures. The highest pressure is 
found for slightly rich mixtures. For ethylene %6.54 and for methane %9.5 [23]. 
 
Figure 3.4 :   Explosion Pressure vs. Initial Pressure For Stoichiometric Propane-Air 
In A 7 Vessel [23] 
At a constant volume, initial pressure affects the explosion. When the initial pressure 
is increased, the energy content, the heat of combustion per unit volume will 
increase. There is a study by Bartkneck for the measurement of explosion pressure 
for the slow deflagration of a 7 litre spherical propane vessel. The results are shown 
in Figure 3.4 and as it noted that there is a nearly linear relation between initial 
pressure and explosion pressure [23]. 
Pipes 
Pipes, including channels and tunnels, also have a simple geometry when confined 
explosions occur. In pipes, pressure generated by flame can propagate away from the 
combustion front.  
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Figure 3.5 :   Maximum Overpressure vs Flame Velocity For Planar And Spherical 
Flames [23] 
In long pipes or open ended pipes a high flame speed is required to generate high 
explosion pressure. Figure 3.5 describe relation between flame speed and explosion 
pressure. In pipes, the planar case is applicable and turbulence is the main 
mechanism causing the flame to accelerate. 
 
Figure 3.6 :   Flame Acceleration In A Pipe, Channel Or Tunnel [23] 
In Figure 3.6 shows the flame acceleration in a pipe, channel or tunnel. When the gas 
burnt expands and pushes the unburnt gas ahead of the flame. The flow ahead of the 
flame causes a turbulent boundary layer to grow and the turbulence enhances the 
burning rate [23]. 
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Figure 3.7 :   Flame Speed in a 1.4 m Diameter Pipe With Methane-Air [23] 
Bartknecht, in his study measuring flame velocities, used a 40 m long and 1.4m 
diameter pipe with methane –air at 1 atm while the end of the pipe was cooled and 
open. The results of this study are seen in Figure 3.7. The highest flame speed is 
observed in the case of one end being open and the gas is ignited at the other closed 
end. In this case, gas ahead of the flame was pushed through the pipe and a loy of 
turbulence was generated [23]. 
3.2 Partly Confined Gas Explosions 
This kind of explosion occurs inside partially open buildings where fuel is 
accidentally released. Compressor rooms and offshore modules are good examples 
for partially confined gas explosions.  
 
Figure 3.8: Gas Explosion in a Partially Confined Area with Process Equipment [23] 
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In these kinds of explosions pressure is relieved only through explosion vent areas; 
for example, light relief walls that open quickly at low pressure. The size and 
location of explosion vent areas are very significant in the resulting explosion 
pressure see Figure 3.8 [23].  
The effects of the explosion depend on many parameters; some important parameters 
are fuel type, gas cloud size and concentration, ignition and geometrical layout, 
confinement and obstructing objects. In buildings, offshore modules and partially 
confined areas there exists process equipment and there are degrees of confinement 
and obstacles. Generally walls, roofs, floors and decks will confine the gas cloud. In 
partially confined gas explosions flame speed is very high. The main reason for that 
is the turbulent mixing caused by the generation of turbulent flow fields ahead of the 
flame. 
A cloud is ignited in the centre of a compartment and when the flame consumes the 
fuel –air cloud, the gas expands at 8-9 times the initial volume. Due to this 
expansion, unburnt gas moves ahead of the flame and flow is generated in the 
compartment. Inside of the compartments there is process equipment and piping and 
these will obstruct the flow and generate turbulence ahead of the flame. The ignition 
point and vent openings are very important parameters for how flow field or 
turbulent flame acceleration develops during a gas explosion [23]. 
The shape of the compartment influences flame acceleration and pressure build-up. 
Generally, there are three principles to use for optimizing compartment shape. First, 
a flame should propagate from an ignition point in a spherical mode as long as 
possible. Second the ignition point should be close to main vent areas, thus hot 
combustion products can be vented out at the beginning of an explosion. Finally, 
avoid an extended flame travel distance and the turbulence in the unburnt gas ahead 
of the flame [23]. 
Types of vent area  
The type of vent area is also important in gas explosions. Some of the significant 
factors for effective venting are the size of the vent area, how the vent areas are 
distributed, the direction of explosion relief, and for the explosive relief panel, how 
quickly it is activated. 
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The vent area should be as large as possible and directed into an open area with less 
obstruction. For example, if one compartment is venting into another or a congested 
area, gas clouds may be pushed into this area and will cause a violent explosion [23]. 
Ignition 
Another important factor for partially confined explosions is location and strength of 
the ignition source. If the ignition is near a vent opening, the flow velocity and 
turbulence will be low, because combustion products will be vented. 
Figure 3.9 :   Differently Ignition Points in a Compartaments [23] 
 
In Figure 3.9 using the same geometry, there are two different types of ignition 
locations. In case a) the ignition is in open side of the compartment and the flow 
velocity ahead of the flame will be low. In case b) the ignition is in the closed side of 
the compartment and a high flow velocity will be generated ahead of the flame which 
will cause a violent explosion [23]. 
Gas cloud 
When an accidental release occurs in a partially confined area, a gas cloud may fill 
only a part of the volume at ignition time. This filling ratio is significant to the power 
of the explosion. In some situations, %30- %50 filling can cause the same explosion 
pressure as in %100 filled compartments. The main reason for this is that during 
explosions, gas that burns will expand and push the unburnt gas ahead of the flame 
[23]. 
 
 19 
3.3 Unconfined Gas Explosions 
Unconfined gas explosions are explosions which occur in open areas such as process 
plants.  
 
Figure 3.10 :   Gas Explosion In A Process Area [23] 
 
The density of fuel is an important parameter for the formation of a combustible 
cloud. If the density is lighter than the air, such as hydrogen, due to buoyancy the 
cloud will rise. In an open area gas will rise and be dispersed quickly. If the gas 
density is heavier than air it is called dense gas and dense gas will drift along the 
ground and will not disperse as quickly as lighter gas. A dense gas release has a 
higher risk for formation into a flammable cloud than does light gas [23]. 
Many large scale experiments show that a truly unconfined gas cloud ignited by a 
weak ignition source can cause a small overpressure while burning. In these cases 
there is no mechanism to accelerate the flame. Combustion is slow and the burned 
gas expands before any significant pressure can occur. In a truly unconfined 
deflagrating cloud the main hazard is the thermal effect. But, if the same cloud 
detonates due to the transition to detonation in a confined neighbouring area, it will 
cause a violent explosion with a strong blast wave. Generally, an open process area 
may be very congested. During an explosion pipes, process equipment, tanks and 
other obstacles will contribute to turbulence generation. The experimental results 
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show that a spherical gas explosion in a much obstructed area needs only a few 
meters of flame travel before the explosion pressure reaches levels that cause violent 
damage [23]. 
 
 Figure 3.11 :   Side View Of A Row Of Tanks [23] 
 
Tanks and process equipment should not be located too close to each other. In Figure 
3.11 there is a row of tanks. If an explosion occurs, the flame will propagate under 
the tanks and will accelerate the flame [23]. 
There is no essential difference between a vapour cloud explosion and a partly 
confined or an unconfined gas explosion.  
3.4 BLEVEs 
BLEVE is an acronym for a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion. After the 
Flixborough accident in 1974 much attention was focused on vapour cloud 
explosions until Kletz point out that BLEVEs should not be neglected being as 
dangerous as VCE and causing as much as damage as VCEs can. Really, one of the 
biggest accidents in the chemical process industry occurred in the LPG plant in 
Mexico City in 1984 where over 650 people died. The Centre of Chemical Process 
Safety defined BLEVE as “a sudden release of a large mass of pressurized 
superheated liquid to the atmosphere” [26]. 
Generally, there are 5 steps which are involved in a BLEVE. The first step is a vessel 
containing pressurized liquid gas (PLG) receives a heat load or fails due to a missile 
hit, fatigue, or corrosion; the second step is the vessel fails; in the third step there is 
an instantaneous depressurization and explosion, and in the fourth step the vessel is 
shattered. In the final step there is a fireball or toxic dispersion [26].  
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On January 4th 1966 at Feyzin in France leakage from a propane storage tank caused 
a big accident. Propane leaking from 1200 m3 spherical tank formed a vapour cloud 
which spread for 150 m and was ignited 25 minutes after the leakage started by an 
automobile stopped on a nearby road. After the fire started, 19 minutes later the 
sphere went through BLEVE. Ten of 12 firemen within 50 m were killed. Another 
man which was 140 m away was badly burned. In total 15 -18 men were killed and 
about 80 injured [26]. 
On November 19th 1984 at The Pemex LPG terminal in San Juan Ixhuatepec Mexico 
City, 4 LPG spheres, each containing 1500 m3 of LPG, and several cylindrical tanks 
suffered from BLEVE. Fragments of tanks and pipes, some of which weighed 40 
tons were blown into the air and found 1200 meters away. The Pemex terminal was 
destroyed. In the accident 650 deaths and more than 6400 people injured. Damage 
was estimated at nearly 31 million dollars [26].    
Table 3.5  Frequency of causative events [26] 
Fire %36 
Mechanical Damage %22 
Overfilling %20 
Runaway reactions %12 
Overheating %6 
Vapour space contamination %2 
Mechanical failure %2 
 
In BLEVE the diameter of the fireball and its thermal radiation level is very 
important. There is much software which predicts thermal radiation levels and 
fireball diameters. For example, to illustrate an off-site emergency plan for a BLEVE 
scenario in a LPG bottling plant the diameter of the fireball in a BLEVE event is 
calculated by CHARM (Complex Hazardous Air Release Model) software [27].  
 
For the estimation of the peak overpressure caused by BLEVE or a similar explosion 
a new method is proposed. In this method superheating energy is used which is the 
difference between the specific enthalpy of the liquid at the temperature before 
explosion and the specific enthalpy of the liquid at its saturation temperature at 
atmospheric pressure. According to this analysis, energy which is converted to 
overpressure will range between 3.5 and 14 % of superheating energy [28].  
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3.5 Vapour Cloud Dispersion Models 
3.5.1 Dense gas dispersion  
 
 Dense gas dispersion occurs when a material has a greater molecular weight than air 
or when it is colder than air and has a greater density. Examples of gases with a 
molecular weight greater than air are; LPG, cyclohexane, freon and chlorine [29].  
When a chemical compound is released as a cold gas, or cooled due to the 
evaporation process we may see LNG, ammonia or hydrogen fluoride. 
Dispersion behavior can be determined by failure type. There are mainly three types. 
The first type is instantaneous release, where the volume of gas is released in a very 
short time. Ruptured vessels or rapidly emptying pressurized tanks are examples of 
an instantaneous source. The second type is the time-varying release. In this type, 
volume flows a long period in an irregular way. A liquid pool which is both 
spreading and vaporizing is a good example. The third type is continuous release. In 
a continuous release there is a constant volume flow rate taking a long time to reach 
steady-state. Steady-state liquid pools and small ruptures in pipes and vessels are 
examples of continuous release [29]. 
In the dispersion process of a dense gas cloud 4 phases are observed: the initial 
phase, the gravity spreading phase, an intermediate phase and the passive dispersion 
phase [29].  
 
The gravity spreading phase best fits the effects of a typical dense gas: 
Turbulence within the cloud is minimized due to the stable stratification of the dense 
gas layer. The density gradient suppresses mixing by the atmospheric turbulence at 
the top of the cloud. Gravity spreading in the horizontal direction is minimized by the 
density gradient [29].   
 
Dense gas dispersion models can mainly be divided into three categories. 
phenomenological models, intermediate models and advanced models that solve 
Navier-Stokes equations. Only the models which solve three dimensional Navier-
Stokes equations describe the internal flow in the cloud [29]. 
3.5.1.1 Simple dense gas dispersion models 
 
Simple dense gas dispersion models describe over all behavior of a cloud. The 
models for instantaneous release are called box models; models for continuous 
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release are called grounded plume models. There is a basic assumption for both 
models, namely that as dispersion moves over flat terrain or water, the substrate 
properties are uniform over the terrain; similarities velocity and concentration 
profiles are imposed in all direction of cloud, local concentration fluctuations are not 
modelled, and spreading of the cloud is described by gravity intrusion models [29]. 
3.5.1.2 Box models 
 
Box models have been developed for the description of the instantaneous release of 
dense gases. Some studies and computer models are: Study of Cox and Carpenter, 
and computer models CONSEQ, SAFETI and PHAST, Study of Eidsvik and 
computer model CHARM , Study of Fryer and Kaiser and computer model DENZ, 
study of   Kaiser and Walker and computer models SAFER and TRACE [29].  
 
Figure 3.12 :   The Box Model Of A Gas Cloud [29]. 
 
All box models assume that a dense cloud has the shape of a flat circular cylinder 
with a uniform radius and height and a uniform gas concentration in the cloud 
volume see Figure 3.12. 
Mean concentration of the cloud is determined by solving the ODE for time 
dependent volume, radius and position of the cloud [29].  
 
The equation for V (t) is: 
 
w eebzrw tedtdV ,..2,r/ 2 pipi +=     )( 13 −sm              (3.1) 
 
bz     : Height of the cloud 
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we,t : Entrainment velocities at the upper surface and edge of the cloud. 
The equation for r(t) is: 
 
)(/ zbgCdtdr ′=       )( 1−ms              (3.2) 
 
C  : constant 
g’ : effective gravity  
This equation is also called a gravity front equation. It describes gravity slumping in 
the initial dispersion phase. 
 
The mean concentration in the cloud is calculated as a function of down-wind 
distance x as in equation: 
vv xocxc )(0 //)( =                                                   (3.3) 
c: mean concentration 
c0: Initial concentration of chemical compound 
v0  : released volume 
This equation is valid for cases in which there is no heat exchange between the cloud 
and its environment or there is no internally generated heat or chemical conversion. 
In most of the present box models these internal heats are included [29]. 
3.5.1.3 Grounded plume models 
 
Grounded plume models have been developed for describing the continuous release 
of a dense gas. If the time variable is replaced with down-wind distance, the source 
plumes from a continuous source can be developed in a similar way to box models. 
For example see the study of Jagger. Developed computer models are CRUNCH, 
PHAST, and DRIFT [29]. 
 
In a grounded plume model it is assumed that the plume has rectangular cross –
section.  
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Figure 3.13 :   The Grounded Plume Model Of A Continuous Dense Gas Plume [29] 
 
bz(x) : height 
b(x) : half width 
Concentration (c) of gas and the advection velocity (u) are uniform over the entire 
area of the cross-section (A(x)). 
The equation for the increase of total mass is: 
 
wbwbdAud eezateax ,, 22/)..( ρρρ +=         smkg 11( −− )                      (3.4) 
 
ρ  and ρ a are, respectively, the densities of the plume gas and of the ambient air. 
w te,  and w ee, are entrainment velocities at the upper surface and at the edge of he 
plume. 
 
There are similarities between the box model and the plume model, and if it is 
assumed that there are the same closure relations for entrainment, a plume model 
equivalent can be built for each box model. The equation for b(x) is: 
 
)(/. bgCdxdbu z′=       )( 1−ms                        (3.5)
   
C   : constant 
g ′  : Effective gravity 
In the steady state plume model gravitational slumping and mixing in longitudinal 
direction is neglected. 
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There is another technique whereby steady release divides total release into many 
puffs and each is considered as a separate release. This technique is used in computer 
model CHARM [29]. 
3.5.1.4 Generalised plume models 
 
Generalized plume models give many spatial variations to the dense gas 
concentration other than assuming only a rectangular or Gaussian profile. In these 
models, the process can be modelled more realisticly. A good example for this is the 
Colenbrander model where similar concentration profiles present plumes as a 
horizontally homogeneous centre section with Gaussian concentration profile edges 
[29]. 
 
Figure 3.14 :   The Down-Wind Development Of The Concentration Profiles In 
Vertical And Lateral Direction, In A Generalized Plume Model [29]. 
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The model is formulated by eddy-diffusivities and it is solved in the vertical and 
lateral direction. The Colenbrander model has been implemented in computer models 
HEGADAS and DEGADIS [29].  
 
If the volume flow rate varies with time, this will affect the concentration level in the 
plume. Colenbrander proposed a concept for these kinds of releases [29]. 
The actual concentration is determined from a Gaussian integration with respect to 
the down-wind distance of all observed concentrations. The Gaussian integration 
involves longitudinal diffusion by means of a down-wind dispersion coefficient 
which is often used as.  
xxx 13.0)( =σ                                                                                                          (3.7) 
The equation is: 
tdututuxtutuctxc aaxaaxacc ))(/)(5.0exp())(.)2(/()(),( 22 σσpi −−= ∫                (3.8) 
3.5.1.5 The conservation equations for a dense gas release 
 
Navier-Stokes equations for instantaneous velocity and density describe the full 
release of a dense gas. These equations express the conservation of total mass, the 
concentration of components and enthalpy, and a 3 vector equation of motion. 
Navier-Stokes equations are partial differential equations [29].  
 
The shallow layer theory is a 3- dimensional approach and is based on a set of 
conservation equations. The advantage of this theory is the simple structure of dense 
gas clouds in cross-wind planes. Zeman has developed the formalism for the 
dispersion of a dense gas release in the presence of wind in a 1-dimensional shallow 
layer model. A computer model based on formalism is the SLAB model [29]. 
3.5.1.6 The shallow layer plume model 
 
The physical quantity fields in a plume are dependent only on down wind distance, x, 
and these are averaged in a cross-wind direction. In shallow plume layer models, 
conservation equations are equivalent to the equations for a 1-dimensional integral 
model with an additional term. Shallow layer equations can be used for lofted plumes 
in the region [29]. 
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3.5.1.7. The shallow layer cloud model 
 
Zeman’s shallow layer model treats puff as a grounded cloud with a half length, half-
width and a height. In this model, physical quantity fields in the cloud are averaged 
over the cloud volume. The shallow layer cloud model can be used for releases above 
ground level [29]. 
3.5.2 Passive dispersion 
 
Passive dispersion is solely caused by atmospheric turbulence. From the stability of 
the atmosphere and the height above the surface atmospheric turbulence is 
determined. 
 
Figure 3.15:   The Scaling Region of the Atmospheric Boundary Layer [29]. 
 
In figure 3.15 scaling region are defined by Gryning. 
Gaussian plume models have been used for all regions on Figure 3.5  
For continuous releases the basic equation of the Gaussian plume model is: 
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For instantaneous release equations is written as: 
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c(x, y, z) :concentration at x, y, z position 
Q : total released mass 
q : release rate  
ua : ambient velocity  at which plume/puff is advected by wind 
σx , σy, σz – dispersion parameters in along end, cross-wind and vertical direction. 
h – Height of plume centre-line 
 
The choice of the plume for averaging transport velocity and dispersion parameters is 
very important.  
 
Generally, transport velocity is taken as wind speed at plume fifth, with a minimum 
of h surface releases. There are many approaches for dispersion parameters, 
fundamentals are discussed in Pasquill and Smith. The Gaussian plume model can 
not be applied to passive dispersion in the surface layer, due to the vertical variations 
of wind speed and the turbulence intensity in the surface layer [29]. 
 
3.5.3 Jet and plume rise (modelling of turbulent jet and plumes) 
 
A pure jet is defined as the source of momentum and energy in the atmospheric 
environment. There are positively and negatively buoyant jet releases. When the 
inertial force and buoyancy force are in the same direction it is called a positive 
buoyant release; when the two force act in opposite directions, it is called negative 
buoyant release. Some examples for buoyant jet releases are exhaust, safety valves, 
punctures in pipes and vent stacks. All positively buoyant jets become a plume. The 
pure plume can emerge from a source without initial momentum. For example, 
cooling towers, chimneys, burners, and pool fires. 
 
The below assumptions are made to simplify jet analysis:  
• The release of the chemical material consists of a turbulent outflow of gases. 
• The source is axially symmetric with uniform outflow. 
• Buoyancy can be neglected or is parallel to the inertial forces. 
Analysis is valid only if there is no large density difference between the jet and the 
surrounding atmosphere. This is called a Boussinesq approximation. Compressibility 
effects are neglected. The atmospheric environment consists stable air in ambient 
conditions. There is no wall or any obstacle [29]. 
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Figure 3.16 :   The Development Of A Turbulent Jet In Still Air [24] 
 
A turbulent jet or plume consist of 3 regions, the first region is the initial region 
which consists of the main flow and a surrounding shear layer; the second region is a 
transition region, and the third, a fully developed jet in Figure 3.16. 
3.5.3.1 Non-buoyant jets 
 
Mass flow q(s) in the jet increase with axial distance 
ea wbdsdq ...2/ ρpi=       )..( 1−mgk                 (3.11) 
b   – Radius between the jet-centre line and the boundary surface of the jet 
ρa   – Ambient density  
we – Entrainment velocity 
3.5.3.2 Buoyant jets 
 
In buoyant jets there is a buoyancy flux factor F0, of the chemical material and 
ambient air appear as a third parameter different from non-buoyant jets. There is no 
dynamic similarity for buoyant jets, so it is not possible to derive simple relations for 
flow quantity as in non-buoyant jets [29]. 
3.5.3.3 Pure plume 
 
A plume is a buoyant jet whose initial momentum is a nearly zero. It is assumed that 
plume weighs less per unit volume than air and the molecular diffusion is negligible 
compared with turbulent transport. 
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Flow quantity can be estimated by a dimensional analysis which begins with the 
definition of the Froude number [29]. 
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uo – exit velocity from source 
bo – radius of real axial jet source 
ρo – material density 
ρa – ambient density 
3.5.3.4 Jets and plume in a cross wind 
 
The release of a gas is generally deflected by the ambient wind and it is called a jet in  
a cross-wind. The release of a chemical in the jet can be calculated with models 
which incorporate the full set of conservation equations for all related elements. 
There are two modifications of assumption for jet and plume rise [29]. 
 
Atmosphere is not quiescent and the Boussinesq approximation is not used. In this 
type the wind imposes a pressure field on the jet. And after some distance, the jet 
movement is approximately horizontal, with mean velocity approaches the wind’s 
velocity as seen in Figure 3.17.  
 
Figure 3.17 :   The Plume Trajectory In A Cross-Flow [29] 
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One-dimensional integral trajectory models: 
Integral models are based on a simple profile shape for velocity, temperature and 
density distribution in the jet cross-section. Mass, momentum, energy and chemical 
compound conservation equations can be integrated over the jet cross-section to get 
ordinary differential equations of some velocity and density characteristics. Further 
assumptions about the entrainment of air into the jet should be adapted to the slody 
system of equations. 
 
The integral equations are of the form [29]: 
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s : axial coordinate of the jet or plume 
y : radial coordinate 
ρ : density 
u  : flow velocity in the jet 
b : width parameter of jet 
ρa – density of ambient air 
 
According to the differences in the assumption of integral trajectory models there are 
differences implemented in the four dense gas dispersion models: DEGADIS, 
HGYSYSTEM, PHAST and SLAB. The four implemented plume models are; 
Ooms model, HFPLUME model, TECJET model, Model of Hoot, Meroney and 
Peterka [29]. 
3.6 Gas Explosion Modeling 
The effects of a gas explosion depend on many factors, for example maximum 
pressure, duration of shock wave interaction with buildings and equipment. Also 
these factors depend on many variables such as fuel type, stociometry of the fuel, 
ignition source type, confinement and venting, initial turbulence level in the plant, 
blockage ratios, size, shape, number and location of obstacles and scale of the 
experiment [30].  
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The reactivity of a fuel has a big effect on the generation of overpressure. For 
example methane is the least reactive gas, while acetylene and hydrogen cause very 
high pressure. Another important issue is the stociometry of a gas cloud. A rich 
mixture produces a higher overpressure than a lean mixture. Ignition sources play an 
important role in generated overpressure. Jet type ignition sources cause higher over-
pressure than point sources [30]. 
 
Venting is one of the ways to reduce over-pressure. Over pressure of explosions in a 
turbulent environment is greater than in a stagnant environment. The blockage ratio 
describes plant congestion. Generally, explosions in a plant with a high blockage 
ratio generate higher over-pressure according to a lower blockage ratio. Size, 
location and shape play an important role in over-pressure [30]. 
 
The scale of an experiment is important. Large scale experiments make higher over-
pressure than small scale experiments. This is why it is difficult to predict the effects 
of an explosion in a real plant in a small scale experiment. A good model should 
include: all variable effects of gas explosions containing the appropriate physics and 
can be suitable for different kinds of gases under different types of conditions.  
 
If a model is implemented is computer code, the model should be numerically 
accurate, user friendly, the run time should be short and the model should be applied 
accurately to different geometries. 
 
There are many requirements: in some of them there is an inconsistency. Many 
complex models, for example, run slowly. Also, there are some computer hardware 
limitations, such as processor speed and memory. Many of the CFD codes don’t 
allow for flame front tracking [30]. 
 
Although all models have some limitations, generally, the results of the simulations 
are compatible with experiments. The selection of the model depends on its accuracy 
level, detail level and running time. 
 
There are many different methods to model gas explosions. Some of them are simple 
with short calculations, some of them are complex. Gas explosion models are divided 
into 4 classes [30]. 
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3.6.1 Empirical models 
 
These models are obtained from experimental data. 
3.6.1.1 TNT equivalency method 
 
The TNT method is simple and widely used. It assumes that a gas explosion can be 
related to a equivalent TNT explosion. The available combustion energy in a vapour 
cloud is converted into an equivalent charge weight of TNT according to: 
fm
mTNT
mff
eTNT xQaE
ExQ
xaQ == .     (kg)                          (3.14) 
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=   TNT equivalency based on mass    [-] 
=   Combustion energy of fuel per unit mass [J-kg-1] 
=   TNT blast energy per unit mass   [J-kg-1] 
=   Mass of fuel involved    [kg] 
=   Equivalent mass of TNT    [kg] 
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Figure 3.18 :   Peakside-on Overpressure Due To A Surface TNT Explosion 
According to Marshall [29]. 
 
Value of EmTNT   is used in a range of 4.19 - 4.65 MJ/kg. In the literature, TNT 
equivalency also indicates as the equivalency factor, yield factor, efficiency factor or 
efficiency [29].  
 
If the TNT-charge weight is known from the graph blast, characteristics in terms of 
the peak side overpressure can be read.  TNT equivalency factors have to be use with 
a particular method to find the amount of fuel involved and in relation to specific 
TNT blast charts. All TNT-equivalence factors are based on energy. Brasie and 
Simpson and Brasie recommended TNT equivalency of %2 for near-field and %5 for 
far-field effects. Eichler and Nspsdensky recommended %20 for the 6.9 kPa 
overpressure level only. 
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 The Health Safety Executive recommended a value of %3 for gases with average 
reactivity such as methane, % 6 for above average gases such as propane oxide and 
% 10 for very reactive gases such as ethane oxide. The maximum overpressure in the 
cloud is taken as 100 kPa and the duration of the blast should be between 100 and 
300ms. Exxon recommended TNT- equivalencies of %3 for a vapour cloud covering 
open terrain and %10 for a vapour cloud in a partially confined or obstructed area. 
Industrial Risk Insurers IRI uses a TNT-equivalence factor of %2. Factory Mutual 
Research factors are assigned to three classes: low-reactive %5, average-reactive 
%10, and high-reactive %15. CPR-14E uses a TNT equivalency factor of %10. The 
British Gas method is intended for a non-detonating cloud of natural gas. Their 
method is based on the mass of the material which can be contained in stochiometric 
proportions in any severely congested region within a limited area. A TNT 
equivalency factor of %20 is used for the total congested mass. Direction des etudes 
et Recherches, France refers to a statistical analysis of 120 damage points of 23 
accidents which show a wide distribution of TNT equivalencies (%0.02 – %15.9) In 
%97 of all cases the TNT equivalency is lower or equal  to %10 while the mean 
value observed was %4 covering %60 of the cases.  French Authority Safety Rule 
recommends % 10 for safety factors and the French Chemical Industry recommends 
the % 4 equivalency; both are based on the full amount of released fuel [29]. 
 
The weakness points of this model are: 
• A Non-specific ratio is necessary 
• The weak gas explosion representation is not good 
• It is very difficult to define an accurate charge centre 
• If the physical behaviour of a gas explosion differs from a solid explosion, 
this model can not be used for modelling a gas explosion. 
• Information applies only to the positive phase duration [30].  
3.6.1.2 TNO method 
 
This method is developed by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific 
Research, known as TNO. This model is similar to the Multi-Energy method; the 
main difference is that the TNO method assumes that the whole vapour cloud 
contributes to the over-pressure; Multi-energy deals with only the portion which 
happens to be in a confined and/or congested area. The TNO model was used in the 
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handbook of methods for the calculation of the physical effects of the escape of 
dangerous materials CPR14E. In the revised version of the CPR14E handbook the 
TNO model was replaced with the Multi-Energy method [30]. 
3.6.1.3 Multi-energy concept 
 
The multi-energy concept assumes that only a confined or obstructed part of the gas 
cloud will contribute to the blast. Unconfined vapour clouds can give rise to a small 
over-pressure if ignited. The over-pressure increases with the increase of 
confinement. The method is based on numerical simulations of a blast wave from a 
centrally ignited spherical cloud with constant velocity flames [29]. 
The blast parameters are read from blast charts, see Figure 3.19 
 
Figure 3.19 :   Multi-Energy Method Blast Chart: Peak Side-On Overpressure [29] 
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Figure 3.20 :   Multi-Energy Method Blast Chart Peak Dynamic Pressure [29]. 
 
Figure 3.21 :   Multi-Energy Method Blast Chart: Positive Phase Duration And 
Blast-Wave Shape [29] 
 
 39 
Equation for scaled distance r ′  is:  
 
3/1)//( apErr =′                                       (3.15) 
r - Distance to explosion centre 
E – Total energy 
pa – ambient pressure 
 
Assuming an explosion strength (of class 1 to 10 ) and by reading the chart from side 
to side, over pressure P’s, scaled peak dynamic pressure pdyn, and the scaled positive 
phase duration can be determined. 
Peak over-pressure is Ps 
Ps=P’s x pa  
Positive phase duration is tp  
Calculate the positive phase duration tp from: 
       aapp apExtt /)/( 3/1′=       (s)                (3.16) 
Calculate the peak dynamic pressure pdyn from: 
adyndyn PPP ×′=        (Pa)              (3.17) 
Determine the shape of the blast-wave from Figure 3.21. 
Calculate the positive impulse is by integrating the overpressure variation during the 
positive phase resulting in multiplying the side-on overpressure with the positive 
phase duration and with a factor of 1/2 [29]: 
Pss tPi ××= 2/1                  (Pa.s)            (3.18) 
 Strength points of this model are; 
• Quick calculation 
• Conservative approximation can be made [30]. 
 
Weakness points of this model are; 
• Difficult to set a sensible value for charge strength, total combustion energy 
and charge size  
• Not well suited for a weak explosion 
• It is not clear how to apply it to several congested regions and multiple blast 
waves. 
• Difficult to represent complex geometries [30]. 
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3.6.1.4 Baker-strehlow method 
 
This method was developed by Baker, Tang Schiere and Silva for the estimation of 
blast pressures from vapour cloud explosions. Later this model was extended by 
Baker, Doolitle, Fitsgerald and Tang. In this model there are number of steps, 
assessing flame speed, fuel reactivity, confinement. In theBaker-Strehlow Method 
blast pressure and impulse are read from graphs [30]. 
In the revision results were obtained from experience by Baker et all. 
 
Strength points of this model are; 
• Quick calculation  
• Easy to use 
• Includes some geometric detail regarding confinement 
• Deal with Multi ignition points [30]. 
 
Weakness point of this model is; 
• Could be over conservative [30]. 
3.6.1.5 Congestion assessment method 
 
This model was developed at the Shell Thronton Research Centre by Cates and 
Samuels. Later, this model was extended by Puttock. In this model, Cates and 
Samuels designed a decision tree procedure for estimating source pressure by taking 
into consideration the layout of plant, confinement, congestion and type of fuel. This 
method was designed to get a conservative pressure measurement [30]. 
 
The Congestion Assessment Method consists of three steps; 
By the assessment of the congested region reference pressure is assigned Pref. This 
pressure is calculated by a maximum over-pressure deflagration of a VCE of 
propane. Fuel factor is used to take account of fuel type. This factor is multiplied by 
the reference pressure to calculate the maximum source pressure. And, it is possible 
to calculate pressure at different distances from the ignition point. Cates and Samuels 
assume [30]. 
 
Puttock extended the model after the result of the MERGE (Modelling and 
Experimental Research into Gas Explosions) project was published. 
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The congestion assessment model is the most advanced empirical model in the report 
of the HSL. But it is not known how the model will react for new scenarios for which 
the model has not been calibrated. 
 
In this program the user must assess the level of congestion and confinement. If the 
geometry is minimal and simple it is easy, but, generally, many plants are very 
complex in design. Although there are guidelines on how to assess confinement and 
the congestion of the plant, it is possible that two different people can find different 
assessment results. As a result the predicted explosions over-pressure will differ [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Easy to use 
• Short run 
• Calibrated against many experiments 
• Can deal with non-symmetrical congestion and a long, narrow plant 
• Approaches the sensible maximum over-pressure as the severity index 
approaches infinity [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Allows only a relatively rough representation by geometry 
• There is no specific assessment of the level of congestion and confinement. 
[30]. 
3.6.1.6 Sedgwick loss assessment method 
 
The Sedgwick Loss Assessment Method is based on Puttock’s Assessment Method. 
There is some refinement according to the CAM. The Sedgwick Energy Ltd. 
Explosion model was tested by Thyer and, due to less detail in the promotional 
leaflets of Sedwick, it is not easy to asses similarities with the Congestion 
Assessment Method. The package has a graphic interface which allows for setting up 
a simulation of simple plants [30]. 
 
The relation of overpressure to distance from the explosion centre is predicted by the 
multi-energy model, congestion assessment model, TNO model and TNT model. In 
two cases, the Flixborough accident and the La Mede Refinery accident, predictions 
were calculated and compared. As a result, among the four models, TNO was the 
worst in two cases and the TNT model overestimated the explosion overpressure. 
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The multi-energy and congestion assessment models were more consistent with the 
observed data [31].  
3.6.2 Phenomenological models 
 
Phenomenological models represent only the essential physics of an explosion. These 
models are simplified physical models. The biggest simplification is made with 
reference to modelled geometry. Mainly instead of modelling the actual events 
geometry, it represents an idealized system. This approach can be used with certain 
types of geometry. But this is not applicable to complex situations. When the 
complexity of the models type is considered phenomenological it exists between the 
empirical and CFD models. Run time of phenomenological models is short. These 
models are suited to run different scenarios and then to have some of these scenarios 
analyzed in more detail with the CFD model [30]. 
3.6.2.1 Shell code for over-pressure prediction in gas explosions (SCOPE) 
 
The SCOPE model was developed at Shell's Thornton Research Center. This model 
can be applied to much geometry. But, initially, it was designed for modelling 
explosions in offshore modules. In March of 1994 SCOPE 2 and in 1997 SCOPE 3 
were released [30]. 
  
The SCOPE code model gas explosion applies the essential physics in a simplified 
form. The SCOPE model is one dimensional and is based on the idealized geometry 
of a vented vessel containing many obstacle grids. Flows through these grids 
determine the turbulence and rate of turbulent combustion downstream from the grid. 
For modelling flows from vents, standard compressible vent flow relations are used. 
The SCOPE 2 can model vent opening. A mushroom-shaped jet is formed by vented 
gas and the highest external pressure is generated when the flame burns in the vortex 
of the mushroom head [30]. 
 
Many experiments have been conducted at different scales and include a 2.5 m3 box, 
a 35 m3 box, and the 550 m3 SOLVEX experiments. According to these experiments, 
good calibration was done by comparing idealized geometries similar to those 
modelled by SCOPE 2 [30]. 
 
Many improvements came with SCOPE 3, including the usage of mixed scale objects 
and a revised turbulent velocity formulation. In addition to side and main vents, 
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SCOPE 3 allows for rear venting. The model was validated by more than 300 
experiments [32] 
There was an improvement in the basic combustion model which now gives a better 
result for variations in stochiometry and mixtures of fuel gases.  Also, a pressure 
dependency has been implemented for the expansion ratio, the laminar burning 
velocity and the modelling of an unconfined but congested plant through with central 
ignition [30]. 
Strong points of this model are; 
• The handling of venting and external explosions 
• Less geometrical detail than the CFD models 
• For the evaluation of different scenarios during the plant design phase, 
SCOPE is a fast tool 
• Validated by many experiments, small, medium, and large scale including 
different gases and various degrees of congestion. 
• Imposed limits to flame self-acceleration yield sensible flame speeds [30]. 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Less geometric details than CFD 
• Only deals with single enclosures 
• Do not provide the same quality information for flow fields as do CFD 
models [30]. 
3.6.2.2 Confined linked chamber explosion (CLICHE) 
 
The CLICHE code has been developed by Advantica Technologies LTD. Initially it 
was developed for confined explosions in buildings, then as it developed its use was 
extended to modelling off-shore and on-shore plants.    
 
A numerical database which contains details of plant geometry is used for the 
calculation of the necessary parameters to model the drag and flame / obstacle 
interactions. Laminar and turbulent velocities are determined from a sub-combustion 
model based on local flow properties. In the CLICHE explosion model for unburnt 
and burnt gas volumes in each chamber conservation laws were applied while it is 
assumed that properties in each chamber are uniform and momentum changes occur 
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only at the perimeter of these volumes occurs. According to the geometry and 
volume of burnt gas a flame shape is empirically predicted [30]. 
 
Many chamber equations form a system of coupled, ordinary differential equations 
which are solved numerically. It is assumed that burnt gas properties are equal to 
equilibrium properties which are calculated during the running of the CLICHE model 
and take into account the temperature and pressure relation. 
Empirical correlations of the flame speed as a function of flame give the laminar 
burning velocity. The turbulent burning velocity is based on a Kolmogorov, 
Petrovsky and Piskounov analysis of the combustion model of Bray [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Uses a sample combustion model, based on a mixture of some physics and 
emprical equations 
• Handles external explosions 
• Includes flame distortion effects due to vents. 
• The ignition location can be anywhere within a cubic volume  
• Short running time 
• From an obstacle database can generate its own input parameters [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• The simple geometry through a series of inter linked chambers. 
• Flow field results are not as accurate as in CFD models [30]. 
3.6.3 CFD models 
 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) is widely used in designing vehicles, air 
planes, weather forecasting, and environmental modelling. CFD models are better 
suited to model explosions in complex geometries. CFD models solve partial 
differential equations related to the explosion process.  
CFD model solutions offer very accurate result regarding flow field, velocities, 
pressure, density and concentrations [30]. 
 
The advantage of CFD models is to simulate flow behaviour where it is not practical 
or possible to carry out experiments. It is possible to run different cases in a short 
period of time. Sub-models which are used are validated by experiments. If the 
 45 
model is not validated, the result obtained will not be reliable. CFD models are very 
useful tools if they are used correctly [30]. 
 
For the simulation of vapour cloud explosions CFD models are the best. By using 
CFD code it is possible to make significant research into the VCE process.  
Phenomenological models are more accurate than correlation (empirical) models and 
can be used for safety evaluations in the design stage of plants. Although the 
correlation model has a limited usage, they are easy to use and can be used for risk 
analysis [31]. 
 
In the CFD models, new model development or extensions of the current models are 
minimal. Also, in CFD models turbulence remains an active topic in the research 
area. There are many improvements in the mathematical concept, but, still, there are 
some subjects which are not dealt with fully, for example, the transition from laminar 
flow to turbulence flow [30]. 
 
With the current rate of progress it seems that the simulation of turbulent combustion 
in a real plant with all its components and with real scale and all its complexity will 
take many years. However, the rapid development in computer hardware, high 
memory and parallel processing will bring some advantages. It may also be required 
to rewrite some codes to increase efficiency [30]. 
3.6.3.1 Exsim 
 
The EXSIM model was developed at the Telemark Technological R&D Centre (Tel-
Tek) in Norway and Shell Global Solutions in United Kingdom. EXSIM uses the 
PDR approach and small object are defined by volume, porosity, area porosity, and a 
drag coefficient.  
 
In version 3.3 a box shaped domain is specified and to build a subsequent geometry 
there are eight basic objects [30]. 
 
These objects are: 
• Large box, resolved by the grid. 
• Cylinder aligned with one of the co-ordinate directions. 
• Pipe bundle in the form of a box. 
• General porous box. 
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• Louvered wall 
• Box beam or box that is not resolved by the grid. 
• Sharp edged beam. 
• Grating [30]. 
 
The EXIM version 3.3 can convert data from different types of CAD formats, which 
helps to set up geometry quickly. Version 3.3 of Exsim has been validated by much 
experimental data, some of which is the experimental data from Phase 2 of the Flast 
and Fire Engineering for Topside Structures, DNV experiments, Shell Solvex full 
and 1/6-th scale tests, CMR experiments on their M24 and M25 modules, 
experiments carried out by Shell at their Buxton site. EXIMS can be used for 
congested configurations with varying degrees of confinement, including a 
completely unconfined geometry [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Compares many small, medium and large scale experiments. 
• Can be used to model congested but unconfined geometries. 
• Can be used to model external explosions 
• CAD data can be used 
• Spatial resolutions of obstacle can be specified [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are;  
• Uses a  standard k – e model 
• Does not have a local grid refinement [30]. 
3.6.3.2 Flame acceleration simulator (FLACS) 
 
The FLACS were developed at the Christian Michelsen Research Institute in 
Norway, now called CMR-GEXCON.  It is based on a structured cartesian grid. 
FLACS has an advanced user interface: include Computer Aided Scenario Design 
(CASD) and Flowvis. Scenario definition for FLACS are generated by CASD, the 
results of simulations are realized by Flowvis. For defining scenarios simple 
geometry is used. For example, pipes are represented by long cylinders. For 
modelling walls and decks there are four different methods: solid unyielding 
surfaces, porous surfaces, blow out / explosion relief panels, or open. CMR has 
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stated that FLACS has been validated by a wide range of experiments, but many of 
these results are confidential [30]. 
 
Some of the predictions of FLACS were compared with various measurements and 
published as parts of MERGE, EMERGE and BFETS projects. The latest 
developments in FLACS are not published in the open literature [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Supported by many small, medium and large scale experiments. 
• Incorporate a water deluge model 
• Can use CAD data 
• Can be used to model congested but unconfined geometries. 
• Can be used to model external explosions 
• Only for the reaction progress variable it uses a second order accuracy 
discretisation scheme, a van Leer Upwind scheme [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Use a k-e model with modifications 
• Instead of a reaction progress variable, uses a first order of accuracy, 
weighted up wind/ central differencing scheme 
• Latest developments are not available in the literature  
• Early versions up to 1993 were calibrated against 1 m cube grid cell size [30]. 
3.6.3.3 Autoreagas 
 
AutoReaGas was developed by Century Dynamics Ltd. and TNO. This code includes 
features of REAGAS and BLAST which were developed by TNO and has an 
interactive environment based on the AUTODYN-3D code which was developed by 
Century Dynamics. AutoReaGas run on many computer platforms such as UNIX, 
Windows 95, Windows NT and later versions of Windows [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Supported by many small, medium and large scale experiments. 
• Incorporate a water deluge model 
• Can use CAD data 
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• Possible to define many objects through a dynamic memory allocation of the 
object database [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Uses the standard k –e turbulence model 
• Uses a first order of accuracy discretization scheme for all variables [30].  
3.6.3.4 Cebam 
 
The CEBAM model was developed by Dr. Clutter at the University of Texas in San 
Antonio. CEBAM is CFD code for aero-propulsion usage, based on a gas-phase, 
multi-step, finite rate combustion. In the CEBAM model combustion reaction 
assumes a one-step, irreversible chemical reaction including fuel, air and material 
products. The model can solve partial differential equations either in the Euler or 
Navier-Stokes form. For the gas explosion code the developer recommended the 
Euler version [33]. 
 
Many VCE scenarios have been simulated with CEBAM and simulation results are 
compared with test data. Overpressure and capture effects were accurately predicted 
by the CFD model [34].   
3.6.4 Advanced CFD models 
 
The main difference between CFD and advanced CFD models is the representation 
of geometry and the accuracy of the numerical schemes which are used [30]. 
3.6.4.1 CFX-4 
 
The CFX-4 code is a commercially available CFD code, developed by AEA 
Technology Engineering Software at Harwell. An explosion module of CFX-4 has 
been developed by the code suppliers and is financed by HSE [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Provides multi-block capability for greater control over the meshing 
• Provides a wide range of discretization schemes 
• Many turbulence models are implemented, including Reynolds stress 
transport models. 
• Can use CAD data 
• Good results for CH4 and H2 deflagrations [30]. 
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Weak points of this model are; 
• Weak results for experiments with gases other than methane and hydrogen,  
• Uses a thin flame model. This model is not very suitable for explosion 
modelling. 
• Ignition model is not complete. 
• Validation deficient for the explosion model and ignition model [30]. 
3.6.4.2 Cobra 
 
This code was developed by Mantis Numerics Ltd. with Advantica Technologies 
Ltd.  
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Cartesian mesh 
• Improved grid refinement/de-refinement facility  
• Can use CAD data [30].  
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Building a complex geometry is very difficult and time-consuming. 
• No model for transition from laminar to turbulent flow [30]. 
3.6.4.3 Newt  
 
Newt is used for modelling very complex geometries. It is an unstructured adaptive 
mesh, a three dimensional, finite volume, computational fluid dynamics code. After 
being developed for non-combusting turbo machines, it is used today for explosion 
prediction at the Engineering Department of Cambridge University and is financially 
supported by the Offshore Safety Division of the Health & Safety Executive. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Adaptive mesh algorithm 
• Requires minimum effort to generate a mesh or complex geometries 
• Converting output to appropriate format used by Newt, any tetrahedral mesh 
generated can be used [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Uses the standard k-3 model 
• Uses a crude ignition and transition model [30]. 
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3.6.4.4 Reacflow 
 
REACFLOW is a CFD code for simulating gas flows during chemical reactions 
which was developed over the last nine years at the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Union in Ispra, Italy. It can be also used for two or three dimensional 
geometry models [30]. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Capable of easier meshing 
• Better obstacle representation and flame front resolution with adaptive 
meshing 
• Fast and good problem solver with the help of a second-order van Leer 
discretisation scheme [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Standard k-3 turbulence model 
• Simple combustion models [30]. 
3.6.4.5 Imperial college research code 
 
It is a 2D computer code using a combustion model, a sophisticated gradient/flame 
front tracking refinement and de-refinement mesh algorithm using an accurate time 
and spatial dicretisation (Total Variation Diminishing-TVD)  schemes. Developed by 
Professor Lindstedt and his group, it also has a parallelized version for greater speed. 
 
Strong points of this model are; 
• Uses second-order moment closures and higher order spatial and temporal 
discretization techniques 
• Adaptive mesh algorithm 
• Simulates detailed chemical kinetics 
• Exists in a parallelized version 
• Obtains the PDF by a realistic method [30]. 
 
Weak points of this model are; 
• Requires long run times for large-scale industrial problems 
• Huge memory usage with tabulated rate data 
• A research code [30]. 
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3.7 Modelling Software  
 
Adora  
ADORA is the acronym for Atmospheric Dispersion of Reacting Agents, which was 
developed by the BlazeTech Corporation for calculating downwind toxic 
concentrations. A free demonstration is available for Windows 95/NT or Windows 
3.1/3.11 [35]. 
 
BLEVE Incident Simulator (BIS)  
The BLEVE is the acronym for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion which 
is an incident simulator for Windows 95/Nt. With this program, for different incident 
scenarios, the user can obtain various information about the estimated time to tank 
failure or tank empty; blast, fireball, projectiles and vapour cloud explosion hazards; 
required cooling water flow rates and quantities; suggested responder position and 
distance. It also has a graphic information module [35].  
 
Breeze  
BREEZE HAZ is especially designed by Trinity Consultants’ for the Risk 
Management Planning and Offsite Consequence Analysis which helps to increase 
productivity, visualize data, analyze offsite consequence issues and prepare a risk 
management plan. It is useful to navigate the US EPA’s requirements and integrates 
the EPA’s most popular air dispersion model for accidental chemical releases [35]. 
 
BREEZE VEXDAM, the Vapour-cloud Explosion Damage Assessment Model 
which can be used to evaluate the damage caused to structure and injury on humans.  
Structure can constructed of many types of materials, for example, aluminium, 
asbestos, brick, concrete, glass, steel and wood [36]. 
 
Charm®  
CHARM® is an MS Windows program developed by the URS Corporation for 
complex hazardous air release model software which calculates the movement and 
concentration of airborne plumes from released chemicals, thermal radiation from 
BLEVE’s, pool and jet fires and over pressures from vapour explosions. It is also 
useful for overlaying footprints on maps for console display or print [35]. 
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Osiris 
Osiris Suite of Emergency Tools is a great tool for safety and hazmat professionals. 
It has a 7 modules; Osiris 4.0 for windows 95/98/NT encompasses the following 
hazmat emergency situations: 
• Leak flow  
• Evaporation 
• Dispersion  
• Explosion  
• Fire 
Osiris' Database includes more than 120 commonly used chemicals and it can be 
customized easily. The program has a user-friendly graphic interface which makes it 
a great tool for risk assessment. Osiris is generally used by firefighters during real 
life emergency responses [35]. 
 
Phast  
PHAST Professional software is used for starting from a potential incident to initial 
release through formation of a cloud or pool to its final dispersion – concentration, 
fire radiation, toxicity and explosion overpressure endpoints can be calculated. 
This program can be used in the design and operation of many industries. The 
program is a user friendly. Advanced users can create and manage their own 
scenarios for new users there are many helpful options which they can use step by 
step through definition, modelling and the presentation of cases. A MS Windows 
interface can be shown on maps, satellite photos and plant layouts can be used for 
design plans, management and government compliance reports, emergency 
preparedness and response plans, and community awareness programs [35]. 
 
PlantSafe™ 
PlantSafe & trade run on a windows platform such as Windows 95/97/NT.This 
program include hazmat/fire/ems expert knowledge bases, plume models, electronic 
white boards, GIS maps reports and more. PlantSafe can be used in emergency 
response and dispatch personnel in case of hazmat releases fires and explosions [35]. 
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Trace®  
TRACE is special software for Chemical Risk Management with which it is possible 
to simulate hazards associated with exposure to toxic chemicals, thermal radiation 
from fires and blast overpressure from explosions.  Also, it can be used for the 
estimation of the number of impacted people and the effectiveness of a protection 
strategy. Trace has a graphic interface which allows the user to define different cases 
and the result of these simulations can be shown on a map. It is also possible to 
export results in many different formats, such as word, excel or power point.  This 
program is generally used in quantitative risk analysis, plant design, emergency 
preparedness planning and for regulatory requirements [35]. 
 
Aloha ® 
The ALOHA program has many features. This program can estimate the maximum 
distance of danger in event of the release of toxic materials; also, it is possible to 
calculate the area wherein the concentration of flammable material can explode. 
This program uses the physical characteristics of released chemicals and a real time 
simulation of known cases to predict a hazardous gas cloud. The program menu is 
user friendly and supported with helpful menus. Aloha has its own library for 
chemicals and it’s possible to extend this library manually. Results are presented in 
different form such a graphs, and texts [37]. 
 
Exsim 
EXSIM is a CFD code for analyzing gas explosions in industry. The developer of 
this code is the Telemark Technological R&D Centre in Porsgrunn, Norway with 
support from the Shell Research Ltd. and the Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC). Validation is done for many scales; the main features are gas 
explosions, gas dispersion, smoke & pollutant dispersion, mitigation, ventilation, 
fires & radiation [38]. 
 
Flacs 
FLACS-GASEX is a part of the FLACS simulator. In this program ventilation and 
dispersion capabilities are removed. In the gas explosion area, FLACS-GASEX is 
one of the leading programs; it has many features. Some of the features are;  
 the possibility of importing geometry from CAD; import of dispersed gas clouds, 
well validated CFD-explosion simulator; efficient pre-processing and simulation 
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times, there are many  gases  and mixtures of some lean fuel; stoichiometric and rich 
mixtures with air; the effect of a water deluge and dilution by an inert gas; the effect 
of an increased oxygen content in the air, non-standard temperatures and initial 
pressure; initial turbulence, rupture discs, relief panels and simplified wall failures; 
blast propagation, local pressures and average wall pressures; 2D and 3D field plots 
of various variables. It also generates automatic mpg-videos from the postprocessor 
[39]. 
 
FLACS is generally used in  offshore installations, onshore plants, for explosions in 
factory buildings, domestic explosions, explosions inside process equipment/ exhaust 
systems, tunnel explosions and  more than 300 platforms and processes in the world 
use FLACS for design and explosion risks [39]. 
 
In the North Sea, BP, Mobil, Norsk Hydro and Statoil have used FLACS in the 
design of new platforms and in the assessment of existing installations.  
It is used also in offshore accident analysis, public inquiries of Piper Alpha and West 
Vanguard, and the evaluation of the vapour cloud explosion accident at the onshore 
process plant in Beek, Holland [40]. 
 
AutoReaGas 
AutoReaGas is a software for modeling gas explosions, and their consequences.  
This program includes both laminar and turbulent combustion models and flame 
acceleration effects can be simulated in the Gas Explosion Solver with a 3D 
geometry. Also, AutoReaGas has a special feature: the Blast Solver calculates the 
propagation of blast waves quickly and accurately.  Blast solver (Euler Based) and 
the gas explosion solver are in communication with each other. For example, the 
result of the gas explosion solver may be transferred to the Blast Solver.  This 
software is validated by many experiments in small, medium and large scale gas 
explosions [41]. 
 
Hams-Gps 
This program is Window based. HAMS-GPS has a wide usage. For example,  HSE-
Management Studies includ risk assessment, accident analysis, ASCLAP-
distribution, plume, puff, spill pool evaporation dispersion modelling, Safety Audits, 
Emergency Management Planning and Control; PROBIT computations, percent and 
absolute fatality; injury computations; fire and  explosion (Vapour Cloud, BLEVE, 
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Confined, Unconfined, Mechanical) modelling; explosion prevention; DOW-fire and 
explosion computations; EIA and developing and establishing an integrated system 
on EMS and  OHSMS under International Standards, on personal health and fitness 
[42]. 
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4. EXPERIMENTAL CHAPTER  
 
In this study the special case of LPG explosions was chosen because, in Turkey, LPG 
is widely used and has a high risks. There are many reasons for LPG explosion; for 
example, fire, sabotage, terrorist attack, technical problem, maintains problem, and 
personal error. There is much software for modelling an explosion. Some of these 
programs don’t have an academic license, some of them have, but the program is 
very restricted, and some these programs have academic license but only for use in 
the US. In this study, the ALOHA program was used. ALOHA contains two types of 
dispersion model the Gaussian dispersion model and the heavy gas dispersion model, 
and according to the chemical material, atmospheric data and release source, it is 
possible to simulate many cases such as the toxic area of the vapour cloud, the 
flammable area of the vapour cloud, the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion, jet 
fire and BLEVE [43-44]. 
Aloha version 5.4.1 was used. 
 
ALOHA doesn’t account for the effects of the following factors;  
a) By products from fires, explosions, chemical reactions 
b) Particulates 
c) Chemical mixtures 
ALOHA is designed to model only pure chemicals and some solutions. The property 
of materials in its library is not valid for mixtures of materials. It is difficult to model 
with mixtures because it is very hard to predict accurate the chemical properties such 
as vapour pressure. 
d) Terrain:  
The program expects the ground below the leaking tank to be flat; and the liquid to 
spread out in all directions 
e) Hazardous fragments: 
In case of an explosion there will be flying debris from the container and the 
surrounding area; this is not modelled with ALOHA. 
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In the first part of the experiments there were 8 different case simulations for an LPG 
filling station. In the second part there is a case simulation for an LPG storage tank at 
ĐTÜ. For each case there was a simulation of the toxic area of a vapour cloud, the 
flammable area of a vapour cloud, the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion, the 
burning of chemicals as a jet fire, and BLEVE, where the tank explodes and the 
chemical burns in a fireball. For some simulations results are shown on a real map 
for the Đpragaz Hadımköy LPG filling station and for a storage tank at the ĐTÜ. The 
third part includes simulation of the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion in case -
1 for 14 different over pressure values 
For the gas propane was used because in industry tanks are designed according to 
propane’s properties. There are some fixed parameters which are used for each 
simulation, these are: date and time by a computer clock; building type is a single 
storied building; the location is ABILENE, TEXAS; the building surroundings are 
unsheltered surroundings; ground roughness is urban or forest; cloud cover is partly 
cloudy; measurement height above ground is 3 meters; stability class is D; there is no 
inversion option; the state of the chemical is liquid and all leaks are through a short 
pipe/valve. 
 
4.1 LPG Filling Station 
 
In this section there are 8 different scenarios for the LPG filling station. In each case 
there is a toxic area of vapour cloud, a flammable area for the vapour cloud, a blast 
area of vapour cloud explosion; the burning of the chemical as a jet fire and BLEVE, 
the tank explodes and the chemical burns in fireball simulations.  
 
4.1.1 Case – 1   
 
In the first case, it is assumed that there is a leakage from a 2 inc circular opening at 
the bottom of the tank and the tank is %90 full. For this case, it is first assumed that 
there is a leak from the tank and that there is no fire area of vapour cloud; the 
flammable area of the vapour cloud and the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion 
is simulated. Then, it is assumed that there is a leak from the tank and it burns as a jet 
fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE occurred, the tank explodes and the chemical 
burns in a fireball. Input values for the program are presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 : Case 1 Input Data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 10.8 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 
inc at bottom of tank 
 
In figure Figure 4.1 the results of a toxic area of vapour cloud are presented, the 
maximum distance for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is 158 meters. Figure 4.2 
includes the result for a flammable area of vapour cloud; the red zone is calculated as 
36 meters, but the threat zone is not drawn because the effects of near-field 
patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable than for short distances. The 
orange zone is up to 53 meters where the concentration is %60 of LEL and flame 
pockets occurs. The yellow zone is up to 176 meters where the concentration is %10 
of LEL. Figure 4.3 presents results from the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion. It 
is assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known; it is ignited by a 
flame or a spark and the level of congestion is defined as congested. The red zone in 
Figure 4.3 indicates a 55.2 kPa overpressure which is never exceeded; the orange 
zone is as large as 39 meters where the overpressure is 24.15 kPa and the yellow 
zone is as large as 60 meters where the overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is in 
danger from the triggering any fire or explosion and the effects of a 24.15 kPa 
overpressure for the property are a collapse of self-framing steel buildings, the 
rupture of the oil storage tank, and snapping failure of the wooden utility tanks. The 
yellow zone presents less dangerous effects to property at 6.9 kPa overpressure, with 
shattering glass windows, occasional damage to window frames, partial demolition 
of houses, the shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of corrugated 
aluminium-steel panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone, 
the main threat to humans is skin laceration from f
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Figure 4.1 :   Case – 1 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud  
 
 
Figure 4.2 : Case – 1 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud  
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Figure 4.3 : Case – 1 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion  
 
Figure 4.4 indicates the simulation results for the burning of a chemical as a jet fire. 
In this situation there is leakage from the tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.4 
the red zone is as large as 33 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and 
potentially lethal in 60 seconds, the orange zone is as large as 45 meters wherein 
thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds, and 
finally the yellow zone is, as large as 68 meters with a thermal radiation of 2.0 
kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds.  
 
Figure 4.5 indicates the simulation results for BLEVE, a tank explosion and the LPG 
burns in a fireball. The red zone is as large as 580 meters wherein thermal radiation 
is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 819 
meters wherein the thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 
60 seconds; the yellow zone is as large as 1.3 km wherein the thermal radiation is 2.0 
kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
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Figure 4.4 : Case -1 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
 
Figure 4.5 : Case -1 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
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4.1.2 Case – 2   
 
In the second case it is assumed that there is a leakage from a 2 inc circular opening 
at the bottom of a tank and that the tank is %30 full. In this case it is first assumed 
that there is a leak from the tank and that there is no fire and that the area of the 
vapour cloud, the flammable area of the vapour cloud and the blast area of the 
vapour cloud explosion is simulated. It is then assumed that there is a leak from the 
tank and it burns as a jet fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE occurs, the tank 
explodes and there are chemical burns in a fireball. The input values for the program 
are presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 : Case 2 Input Data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 10.8 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 30 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 
inc at bottom of tank 
 
Figure 4.6 presents results from a toxic area of vapour cloud where the maximum 
size of TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is as large as 158 meters. Figure 4.7 shows the 
effects in the flammable area of a vapour cloud; the red zone is calculated up to 36 
meters, but the threat zone is not drawn because the effects of near-field patchiness 
make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. The orange zone is as 
large as 53 meters wherein the concentration is %60 of LEL and flame pockets 
occur. The yellow zone is as large as 175 meters wherein the concentration is %10 of 
LEL. Figure 4.8 indicates the effects found in the blast area of a vapour cloud 
explosion. It is assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known; it 
was ignited by a flame or spark and the level of congestion is defined as “congested”.  
 
The red zone in Figure 4.8 indicates 55.2 kPa which is never exceeded; the orange 
zone is as large as 30 meters where the overpressure is 24.15 kPa.  The yellow zone 
is as large as 60 meters with an overpressure of 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is 
hazardous for its potential to trigger a fire or explosion and the effects of it’s 24.15 
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kPa overpressure for property are the collapse of self-framing steel buildings, the 
rupture of the oil storage tank, and snapping failure of the wooden utility tanks. The 
yellow zone has at, 6.9 kPa overpressure, less dangerous effects on property with the 
shattering of glass windows, occasional damage to window frames, the partial 
demolition of houses, the shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of 
corrugated aluminium-steel panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the 
yellow zone the danger to humans is skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 : Case -2 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.7 : Case – 2 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
 
Figure 4.8 : Case – 2 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
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Figure 4.9 indicates simulation results from burning propane as a jet fire. In this 
situation there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.9 the red 
zone is as large as 33 meters with thermal radiation of 10.0 kW/m2; it is potentially 
lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 45 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds; the yellow 
zone is as large as 67 meters with a thermal radiation of 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs 
within 60 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.10 indicates simulation results for BLEVE, a tank explosion and the 
propane burns in a fireball. The red zone is as large as 416 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds. The orange zone is as 
large as 587 meters wherein thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns 
occurs within 60 seconds. The yellow zone is as large as 916 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.9 : Case – 2 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
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Figure 4.10 : Case -2 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
  
4.1.3 Case – 3  
 
In the third case it is assumed that there is a leak from a 2 inc circular opening at the 
bottom of a tank and the tank is %70 full. In this case it is first assumed that there is a 
leak from the tank and that there is no fire and the area of the vapour cloud, the 
flammable area of the vapour cloud and the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion 
is simulated. It is then assumed that there is a leak from the tank and it burns as a jet 
fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE occurs, the tank explodes and the propane 
burns as a fireball. Input values for the program are presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 : Case 3 input data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 10.8 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 65 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 
inc at bottom of tank 
 
In Figure 4.11 the findings from the toxic area of a vapour cloud are presented; the 
maximum distance for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is up to 160 meters. Figure 
4.12 includes the effects from the flammable area of a vapour cloud; the red zone is 
calculated as 36 meters, but the threat zone is not drawn because the effects of near-
field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable than for short distances. 
The orange zone is as large as 53 meters wherein the concentration is %60 of LEL 
and flame pockets occurs. The yellow zone is as large as 176 meters wherein 
concentration is %10 of LEL. 
 
 Figure 4.13 presents the results from the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion. It is 
assumed that the time of vapour cloud ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a 
flame or spark and that the level of congestion is defined as “congested”. The red 
zone in Figure 4.13 indicates a 55.2 kPa overpressure which is never exceeded; the 
orange zone is as large as 39 meters wherein the overpressure is 24.15 kPa and the 
yellow zone is as large as 60 meters wherein the overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange 
zone is dangerous because it has a potential to trigger a fire or explosion and the 
effects of a 24.15 kPa overpressure on property are the collapse of self-framing steel 
buildings, the rupture of oil storage tanks, and snapping failure of wooden utility 
tanks. The yellow zone has the less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure 
wherein glass windows shatter; there is occasional damage to window frames, the 
partial demolition of houses, the shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure 
of corrugated aluminium-steel panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the 
yellow zone hazardous effects for humans is skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
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Figure 4.11 : Case -3 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
Figure 4.12 : Case – 3 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.13 : Case – 3 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
Figure 4.14 indicates simulation results from the burning of propane as a jet fire. In 
this situation there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.14 the 
red zone is 33 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal 
in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 45 meters wherein thermal radiation is 
5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds, and the yellow zone is as 
large as 68 meters wherein thermal radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 
seconds.  
 
Figure 4.15 indicates the simulation results for BLEVE, a tank explosion and 
propane burning as a fireball. The red zone is as large as 525 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as 
large as 741 meters wherein thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns 
occurs within 60 seconds; the yellow zone is as large as 1.2 km wherein thermal 
radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
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Figure 4.14 : Case – 3 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
 
Figure 4.15 : Case -3 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
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4.1.4 Case – 4   
 
In the fourth case it is assumed that there is a leak from a 2 inc circular opening at the 
bottom of a tank and that the tank is %90 full, but atmospheric conditions are 
different. For this case it is first assumed that there is a leak from the tank and there 
is no fire and the area of the vapour cloud, the flammable area of the vapour cloud 
and the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion are simulated. It is further assumed 
that there is a leak from the tank and it burns as a jet fire. Finally, it is assumed that 
BLEVE occurs, the tank explodes and the chemical burns as a fireball. The input 
values for the program are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 : Case 4 Input Data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 2 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 28 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 26 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 
inc at bottom of tank 
 
Figure 4.16 presents the effects of toxic area of a vapour cloud; the maximum 
distance for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is as large as 291 meters. Figure 4.17 
shows the results of a flammable area of a vapour cloud; the red zone is as large as 
85 meters wherein concentration is equal to the LEL value. The orange zone is as 
large as 111 meters wherein concentration is %60 of LEL and flame pockets occurs. 
The yellow zone is as large as 299 meters wherein concentration is %10 of LEL. 
Figure 4.18 indicates results from the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion. It is 
assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a 
flame or spark and the level of congestion is defined as “congested”.  
 
The red zone in Figure 4.18 indicates 55.2 kPa which is never exceeded; the orange 
zone is as large as 93 meters wherein the overpressure is 24.15 kPa.  The yellow 
zone is as large as 155 meters wherein overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is 
susceptible to the triggering of a fire or explosion and the effects of a 24.15 kPa 
overpressure for property are the collapse of self-framing steel buildings, the rupture 
of oil storage tanks, and snapping failure of wooden utility tanks. The yellow zone 
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has less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure with the shattering of glass 
windows, occasional damage to window frames, partial demolition of houses, the 
shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of corrugated aluminium-steel 
panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone effects on 
humans is skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
 
 
Figure 4.16 : Case -4 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.17 : Case – 4 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
Figure 4.18 : Case – 4 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
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Figure 4.19 indicates simulation results from burning propane as a jet fire. In this 
situation there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.19, the red 
zone is as large as 31 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and 
potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 45 meters wherein 
thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds; the 
yellow zone is as large as 70 meters wherein thermal radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and pain 
occurs within 60 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.20 indicates simulation results for BLEVE, a tank explosion and propane 
burning in a fireball. The red zone is as large as 540 meters wherein the thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds. The orange zone is as 
large as 762 meters wherein thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns 
occurs within 60 seconds. The yellow zone is as large as 1.2 km meters wherein 
thermal radiation is a 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 : Case – 4 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
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Figure 4.20 : Case - 4 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
4.1.5 Case – 5   
In the fifth case, it is assumed that there is a leak from a 4 inc circular opening at the 
bottom of a tank and the tank is %90 full. In this case first it is assumed that there is a 
leak from a tank and there is no fire and the area of the vapour cloud, the flammable 
area of the vapour cloud and the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion is 
simulated. Then, it is assumed that there is a leak from a tank and it burns as a jet 
fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE occurs, the tank explodes and the chemical 
burns in a fireball. Input values for the program are presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 : Case 5 input data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 10.8 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 4 
inc at bottom of tank 
 
Figure 4.21 shows the effects of toxic area of a vapour cloud, the maximum distance 
for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 of up to 325 meters. Figure 4.22 shows the effects 
of the flammable area of a vapour cloud; the red zone is as large as 73 meters 
wherein concentration is equal to the LEL value. The orange zone is as large as 102 
meters wherein concentration is %60 of LEL and flame pockets occur. The yellow 
zone is as large as 343 meters wherein concentration is %10 of LEL. Figure 4.23 
indicates results from the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion. It is assumed that 
the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a flame or 
spark and the level of congestion is defined as “congested”.  
 
The red zone in Figure 4.23 indicates 55.2 kPa is which is never exceeded; the 
orange zone is as large as 70 meters wherein overpressure is 24.15 kPa. The yellow 
zone is as large as 113 meters wherein overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is 
susceptible to the triggering of a fire or explosion and the effects of a 24.15 kPa 
overpressure for property are the collapse of self-framing steel buildings, rupture of 
oil storage tanks, and the snapping failure of wooden utility tanks. The yellow zone 
has the less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure wherein glass windows 
shatter, there is occasional damage to window frames, partial demolition of houses, 
the shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, failure of corrugated aluminium-steel 
panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone, effects on 
humans include skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
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Figure 4.21 : Case -5 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
Figure 4.22 : Case – 5 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.23 : Case – 5 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
Figure 4.24 indicates simulation results from the burning of propane as a jet fire. In 
this situation there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.24 the 
red zone is as large as 62 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and 
potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 85 m wherein thermal 
radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds, and the yellow 
zone is as large as 131 meters with thermal radiation of 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs 
within 60 seconds.  
 
Figure 4.25 indicates the simulation results for BLEVE, a tank explosion and 
propane burning in a fireball. The red zone is as large as 580 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as 
large as 819 wherein thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs 
within 60 seconds, and the yellow zone is as large as 1.3 km with thermal radiation 
of 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
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Figure 4.24 : Case – 5 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
 
Figure 4.25 : Case -5 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
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4.1.6 Case – 6  
 
The sixth case assumes that there is a leak from a 2 inc circular opening at the top of 
a tank and that the tank is %90 full. For this case it is first assumed that there is a 
leak from the tank, that there is no fire, the flammable area of the vapour cloud and 
the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion is simulated. It is then assumed that there 
is a leak from the tank and it burns as a jet fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE 
occurs, the tank explodes and the chemical burns in a fireball. Input values for the 
program are presented in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 : Case 6 input data  
 
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 10.8 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 inc at 
top of tank (%85 of tank) 
 
Figure 4.26 shows the effects of a toxic area of a vapour cloud where the maximum 
distance for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is up to 160 meters. Figure 4.27 shows 
the effects of the flammable area of vapour cloud; the red zone is calculated as 36 
meters, but, the threat zone is not drawn because the effects of near-field patchiness 
make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. The orange zone is as 
large as 53 meters wherein concentration is %60 of LEL and flame pockets occur. 
The yellow zone is as large as 173 meters wherein concentration is %10 of LEL. 
Figure 4.28 shows the effects from the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion. It is 
assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a 
flame or spark and the level of congestion is defined as “congested”.  
 
The red zone in Figure 4.28 indicates 55.2 kPa which is never exceeded; the orange 
zone is as large as 39 meters wherein overpressure is 24.15 kPa. The yellow zone is 
as large as 60 meters wherein overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is susceptible 
to the triggering of a fire or explosion and the effects of a 24.15 kPa overpressure on 
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property is the collapse of self-framing steel buildings; rupture of oil storage tanks, 
and the snapping failure of wooden utility tanks. The yellow zone has the less 
dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure. There is shattering of glass windows, 
the occasional damage to window frames, the partial demolition of houses, the 
shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, failure of corrugated aluminium-steel 
panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone the effects on 
humans are skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.26 : Case -6 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.27 : Case – 6 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
Figure 4.28 : Case – 6 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
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Figure 4.29 indicates the simulation results from the burning of propane as a jet fire. 
In this situation there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.29 
the red zone is as large as 33 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and 
potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 45 meters wherein 
thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds; the 
yellow zone is as large as 67 meters wherein thermal radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and 
pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.30 indicates the simulation results for BLEVE, tank explosion and propane 
burning in a fireball. The red zone is as large as 580 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds. The orange zone is as 
large as 819 meters wherein thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns 
occurs within 60 seconds. The yellow zone is as large as 1.3 km wherein thermal 
radiation is a 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 4.29 : Case – 6 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
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Figure 4.30 : Case -6 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
 
4.1.2 Case – 7   
 
In the seventh case it is assumed that there is a leak from a 4 inc circular opening at 
the top of a tank and that the tank is %90 full. For this case, it is first assumed that 
there is a leak from the tank and there is no fire and the area of the vapour cloud, the 
flammable area of the vapour cloud and the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion 
is simulated. Then, it is assumed that there is a leak from tank and it burns as a jet 
fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE occurs, the tank explodes and the chemical 
burns in a fireball. Input values for the program are presented in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 : Case 7 Input Data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 10.8 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 4 inc at 
top of tank (%85 of tank) 
 
In figure Figure 4.31 the effects of the toxic area of a vapour cloud are presented; the 
maximum distance for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is as large as 324 meters. 
Figure 4.32 includes the effects of the flammable area of a vapour cloud; the red 
zone is calculated as 72 meters wherein concentration is equal to LEL. The orange 
zone is as large as 102 meters wherein concentration is %60 of LEL and flame 
pockets occur. The yellow zone is as large as 342 meters wherein concentration is 
%10 of LEL. 
 
 Figure 4.33 presents results from the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion. It is 
assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a 
flame or spark and that the level of congestion is defined as “congested”. The red 
zone in Figure 4.33 indicates a 55.2 kPa overpressure which is never exceeded; the 
orange zone is as large as 57 meters wherein the overpressure is 24.15 kPa and the 
yellow zone is as large as 113 meters wherein overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange 
zone is liable to the triggering of a fire or explosion and the effects of 24.15 Kpa 
overpressure for property are the collapse of self-framing steel buildings, the rupture 
of oil storage tanks, and the snapping failure of wooden utility tanks. The yellow 
zone has the less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure with shattering glass 
windows, occasional damage to window frames, the partial demolition of houses, 
shattering corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of corrugated aluminium-steel 
panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone the danger to 
humans is skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
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Figure 4.31 : Case -7 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
Figure 4.32 : Case – 7 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.33 : Case – 7 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
Figure 4.34 indicates simulated results of burning propane as a jet fire. In this 
example there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In Figure 4.34 the red 
zone is as large as 62 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially 
lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 85 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds, and, finally 
the yellow zone is as large as 130 meters wherein thermal radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and 
pain occurs within 60 seconds.  
 
Figure 4.35 indicates the simulation results for BLEVE, a tank explosion and 
propane burning as a fireball. The red zone is as large as 580 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as 
large as 819 wherein thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs 
within 60 seconds; the yellow zone is as large as 1.3 km with thermal radiation of 2.0 
kW/m2 and pain within 60 seconds. 
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Figure 4.34 : Case – 7 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
 
Figure 4.35 : Case -7 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
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4.1.8 Case – 8  
 
In the last case, it is assumed that there is a leak from a 2 inc circular opening at the 
top of a tank, the tank is %90 full, but the atmospheric conditions are different. For 
this case, it is first assumed that there is a leak from the tank and that there is no fire 
and the area of the vapour cloud, the flammable area of the vapour cloud and the 
blast area of the vapour cloud explosion is simulated. It is then assumed that there is 
a leak from the tank and it burns as a jet fire. Finally, it is assumed that BLEVE 
occurs, tank explodes and the chemical burns as a fireball. Input values for the 
program are presented in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 : Case 8 input data  
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 3.6 m 
Tank length 18 m 
Wind speed, direction 2 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 28 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 26 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 inc at 
top of tank (%85 of tank) 
 
Figure 4.36 shows the effects of the toxic area of a vapour cloud, where the 
maximum distance for TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 is up to 291 meters. Figure 
4.37 includes the effects of the flammable area of the vapour cloud; the red zone is 
calculated as 85 meters wherein concentration is equal to the LEL value. The orange 
zone is as large as 111 meters wherein concentration is %60 of LEL and flame 
pockets occur. The yellow zone is as large as 299 meters wherein concentration is 
%10 of LEL. Figure 4.38 indicates the results from the blast area of a vapour cloud 
explosion. It is assumed that the time of ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a 
flame or spark and the level of congestion is defined as “congested”.  
 
The red zone in Figure 4.38 indicates a 55.2 kPa which is never exceeded; the orange 
zone is as large as 91 meters wherein the overpressure is 24.15 kPa. The yellow zone 
is as large as 155 meters wherein overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is 
susceptible to the triggering of fires or explosion and the effects of a 24.15 kPa 
overpressure to property is the collapse of self-framing steel buildings, the rupture of 
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oil storage tank; and the snapping failure of wooden utility tanks. The yellow zone 
has the less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure with the shattering of glass 
windows, occasional damage to window frames, the partial demolition of houses, the 
shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of corrugated aluminium-steel 
panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone the effects on 
humans are skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
 
 
Figure 4.36 : Case -8 Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.37 : Case – 8 Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
 
Figure 4.38 : Case – 8 Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
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Figure 4.39 indicates the simulation results from burning propane as a jet fire. In this 
situation there is a leak from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.39 the red 
zone is as large as 31 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and 
potentially lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 45 m wherein thermal 
radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs within 60 seconds; the yellow 
zone is as large as 70 meters with a thermal radiation of 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs 
within 60 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.40 indicates simulation results for BLEVE, tank explosion and propane 
burning in a fireball. The red zone is as large as 540 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds. The orange zone is as 
large as 762 meters wherein the thermal radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns 
occurs within 60 seconds. The yellow zone is as large as 1.2 km with thermal 
radiation of 2.0 kW/m2 and pain within 60 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 4.39 : Case – 8 Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
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Figure 4.40 : Case -8 BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
 
4.1.9 Risk determination of case -1  
 
For case -1 the simulation of the toxic area of the vapour cloud, the flammable area 
of a vapour cloud, the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion and  the burning of a 
LPG as a jet fire are shown on a real plant. In figure 4.41 there is a map of the LPG 
filling station.  
 
Figure 4.42 shows simulation results for the toxic area of the vapour cloud. In the 
figure it is indicated that the toxic area of the vapour cloud is covering the LPG 
pump area and maximum perimeter is outside of the plant area. So there is a risk to 
the neighbouring area. There is no significant risk for workers because management 
and social facility building, and the filling house are outside of the affected area.  
 
Figure 4.43 indicates the flammable area of the vapour cloud. If there is leakage the 
flammable area of the vapour cloud is covers the LPG pump area and a zone of 
outside the plant. It is advantageous that the LPG pump station is exproof because in 
this area the concentration of gas is %60 of the LEL value. Because the flammable 
area is outside of the plant zone there is a risk to neighbouring plants and property. 
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There is no significant risk for workers because management and social facility 
building and filling house are outside of the affected area.  
 
 
 Figure 4.41 : Map of LPG Filling Station 
 
A: Propane Storage Tank 
B: Management and Social Facility Building 
C: Truck Tanker 
D: LPG Pump 
E: Power Buıldıng 
F: Water Tanks 
G: Filling House 
 
 
 
A 
C 
G 
D 
E 
F 
B 
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Figure 4.42 : Toxic Area Of Vapour Cloud 
 
 
Figure 4.43 : Flammable area of vapour cloud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Toxic Area of Vapor 
Cloud 
 
Potentially life-threatening 
Flammable Area 
 of Vapor Cloud 
 
 
 2.000 ppm - %10 LEL 
12.000 ppm - %60 LEL 
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Figure 4.44 indicates the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion. In the event of a 
vapour cloud explosion, blast effects for 6.9 kPa and 24.15 kPa are simulated on the 
map. The orange zone is dangerous for its susceptibility to fire or explosion; the 
effects of a 24.15 kPa overpressure to property are a collapse of self-framing steel 
buildings, the rupture of oil storage tanks, and a snapping failure of wooden utility 
tanks. The yellow zone has the less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure to 
property with the shattering of glass windows, occasional damage to window frames, 
the partial demolition of houses, shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure 
of corrugated aluminium-steel panelling, and a failure of wood siding panels. In the 
yellow zone the effect on humans is skin laceration from flying glass [31]. The red 
zone includes LPG pump and the neighbouring LPG storage tanks. The yellow zone 
is wide and includes a truck tanker, a power building and a small part of the filling 
house. There is no significant risk to workers because management, the social facility 
building and the filling house are outside the affected area. 
 
Figure 4.45 indicates thermal radiation zone. The burning of a chemical as a jet fire 
is simulated on the map in three different zones: the first zone is very dangerous 
because thermal radiation is 10 KW/(sq m) and causes a death in 60 seconds. This 
zone includes the truck tanker and also a neighbouring storage tank. This can lead to 
an explosion of other storage tanks and the killing of workers in the truck tanker. The 
second zone is also dangerous as in this area the thermal radiation is 5 KW/(sq m) 
and resulting 2nd degree burns in 60 seconds. The third zone is less dangerous as in 
this area thermal radiation is 2 KW/(sq m) and results in pain in 60 seconds. There is 
no significant risk to workers because management and the social facility building 
and the filling house are outside the affected area.  
 
For case- 1 the BLEVE scenario is not shown on the map because for a % 90 full 
tank it is nearly impossible for BLEVE to occur. To simulate a BLEVE scenario, 
there should first be a calculated volume and the conditions in which BLEVE can 
occur. 
 
As is indicated from the simulation results management and social facility building, 
and the filling house locations are in correct location. There is no significant risk for 
these places. But if there was a factory in south side of the plant it is necessary to do 
a risk assessment for that plant. 
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Figure 4.44 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
 
Figure 4.45 :Thermal Radiation Zone  
 
 
Blast Area of Vapour 
Cloud Explosion 
 6,9 Kpa – Shatters glass 
24,15 Kpa – Serious injury 
Thermal Radiation Zone 
10 kW/(sq m)–Potentially lethal in 60 sec 
5 kW/(sq m)–2nd Degree Burns in 60 sec 
2 kW/(sq m)–Pain in 60 sec 
2 1 
3 
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Table 4.9 : Property Damage Criteria [45]  
Overpressure (kPa) Injury Source 
0,207 
Occasional breaking of large glass windows 
already under strain a 
0,276 
Loud noise (143 dB). Sonic boom glass 
failure a 
0,69 Breakage of small windows, under strain a 
1,035 Typical pressure for glass failure a 
2,07 
Safe distance” (probability 0.95 no serious 
damage beyond this value) 
Missile limit 
Some damage to house ceilings 
10% window glass broken a 
2,76 Minor structural damage a, c 
3,45 - 6,9 
Shattering of glass windows, occasional 
damage to window frames. One source 
reported glass failure at 1 kPa (0.147 psi) a, c, d, e 
4,83 Minor damage to house structures a 
6,9 
Partial demolition of houses, made 
uninhabitable a 
6,9 - 13,8 
Shattering of corrugated asbestos siding 
Failure of corrugated aluminum–steel 
paneling 
Failure of wood siding panels (standard 
housing construction) a, b, d, e 
8,97 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted a 
13,8 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses a 
13,8 - 20,7 
Shattering of nonreinforced concrete or 
cinder block wall panels [10.3 kPa (1.5 psi) 
according to another source] a, b, c, d 
15,87 Lower limit of serious structural damage a 
17,25 50% destruction of brickwork of house a 
20,7 
Steel frame building distorted and pulled 
away from foundations a 
20,7 - 28,29 
Collapse of self-framing steel panel 
buildings 
Rupture of oil storage tanks 
Snapping failure — wooden utility tanks a, b, c 
27,6 
Cladding of light industrial buildings 
ruptured a 
33,12 Failure of reinforced concrete structures e 
34,5 Snapping failure — wooden utility poles a, b 
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Table 4.9 : Property Damage Criteria [45] 
Overpressure (kPa) Injury Source 
34,5 - 48,3 Nearly complete destruction of houses a 
48,3 Loaded train wagons overturned a 
48,3 - 55,2 
Shearing/flexure failure of brick wall panels 
[20.3 cm to 30.5 cm (8 in. to 12 in.) thick, 
not reinforced] 
Sides of steel frame buildings blown in  
Overturning of loaded rail cars 
a, b, c, d                                               
d               
b,c                              
62,1 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished a 
69 Probable total destruction of buildings a 
207 Steel towers blown down b, c 
607,2 Crater damage e 
   
aF. Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 1996. 
bBrasie and Simpson, 1968.  
cU.S. Department of Transportation, 1988. 
dU.S. Air Force, 1983.  
eMcRae, 1984.  
4.2 LPG Storage tank at ĐTÜ 
In the Maslak Campus next to the central canteen there is a LPG storage tank. In this 
area if there is a leak from the tank the toxic area of the vapour cloud, the flammable 
area of the vapour cloud, the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion, the burning of 
a LPG as a jet fire and a BLEVE scenario are simulated. The first four simulations 
are shown on the ĐTÜ map, the map is copied from a google earth program.  
 
Table 4.10 : Input Data for LPG Storage Tank at ĐTÜ   
Parameter Unit / Value 
Gas Propane 
Tank type Cylindrical 
Tank diameter 1.17 m 
Tank length 4.64 m 
Wind speed, direction 4 m/s NNE 
Ambient Temperature 10.5 oC  
Humidity % 70 
Temperature inside tank 8 oC 
Filling ratio of tank % 90 
Leak type, dimension Circular opening 2 inc at 
bottom of tank  
 
This case assumes there is a leakage from a 2 inc circular opening at the bottom of 
the tank and the tank is %90 full. For this scenario it is first assumed that there is a 
leak from the tank and there is no fire and area of vapour cloud, flammable area of 
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vapour cloud and blast area of vapour cloud explosion is simulated. Then, it is 
assumed that there is a leak from the tank and it burns as a jet fire. Finally, it is 
assumed that BLEVE occurs, the tank explodes and the chemical burns as a fireball. 
The input values for program are presented in Table 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.46 shows the toxic area of the vapour cloud, with a maximum distance for 
TEEL-1, TEEL-2 and TEEL-3 of up to 187 meters. 
 
Figure 4.47 shows the flammable area of the vapour cloud; the red zone is calculated 
as 47 meters but the threat zone is not drawn because the effects of near-field 
patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. The orange 
zone is as large as 63 meters where concentration is %60 of LEL and flame pockets 
occurs. The yellow zone is as large as 193 meters where concentration is %10 of 
LEL. 
 
Figure 4.48 indicates results from the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion. It is 
assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition is not known, that it is ignited by a 
flame or spark, and the level of congestion is defined as “congested”. The red zone in 
Figure 4.48 indicates a 55.2 kPa which is never exceeded; the orange zone is as large 
as 43 meters with an overpressure of 24.15 kPa.  The yellow zone is as large as 89 
meters wherein the overpressure is 6.9 kPa. The orange zone is susceptible to the 
triggering of a fire or explosion and the effects of a 24.15 kPa overpressure for 
property are the collapse of self-framing steel buildings, the rupture of oil storage 
tanks, and the snapping failure of wooden utility tanks. The yellow zone has the 
dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure for property with the shattering of glass 
windows, occasional damage to window frames, the partial demolition of houses, the 
shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of corrugated aluminium-steel 
panelling, and the failure of wood siding panels. In the yellow zone, the effects on 
humans is skin laceration from flying glass [45]. 
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Figure 4.46 : Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
Figure 4.47 : Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
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Figure 4.48 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
Figure 4.49 indicates the simulation results from burning propane as a jet fire. In this 
situation there is leakage from a tank and it burns as a jet fire. In figure 4.49 the red 
zone as large as 29 meters wherein thermal radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially 
lethal in 60 seconds; the orange zone is as large as 41 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occur within 60 seconds; the yellow 
zone is as large as 64 meters wherein thermal radiation is 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs 
within 60 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.50 indicates simulation results for BLEVE, tank explosion and propane 
burning as a fireball. The red zone is as large as 184 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is 10.0 kW/m2 and potentially lethal in 60 seconds. The orange zone is as 
large as 260 meters with thermal radiation of 5.0 kW/m2 and 2nd degree burns occurs 
within 60 seconds. The yellow zone is as large as 406 meters wherein thermal 
radiation is a 2.0 kW/m2 and pain occurs within 60 seconds. 
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Figure 4.49 : Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
 
Figure 4.50 : BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fireball 
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4.2.1 Risk determination of LPG storage tank  
 
Figure 4.52 indicates that the toxic area of the vapour cloud is covering the gym and 
the road between the gym and canteen. Figure 4.53 indicates that in case of a leak the 
flammable area of vapour cloud will cover the intermediate road and some part of the 
canteen where the car and truck are stopped. This area is very dangerous because if 
either the car or truck is ignited, there could be a big explosion. So, there is a risk for 
personnel and students in this area. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.51 : Map of ĐTÜ Maslak campus  
 
cafeteria 
Gym 
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Figure 4.52 : Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
 
 
Figure 4.53 :  Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potentially life-threatening 
LPG TANK 
 2.000 ppm - %10 LEL 
12.000 ppm - %60 LEL 
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Figure 4.54 indicates the blast area of the vapour cloud explosion. In the instance of a 
vapour cloud explosion, blast effects for 6.9 kPa and 24.15 kPa are simulated on the 
map. The orange zone is dangerous for triggering a fire or explosion and the effects 
of a 24.15 Kpa overpressure for property are the collapse of self-framing steel 
buildings, the rupture of oil storage tanks and the snapping failure of wooden utility 
tanks.  
 
The yellow zone has the less dangerous effects of a 6.9 kPa overpressure which leads 
to the shattering of glass windows, the occasional damage to window frames, the 
partial demolition of houses, shattering of corrugated asbestos siding, the failure of 
corrugated aluminium-steel panelling and the failure of wood siding panels. In the 
yellow zone the effects on humans are skin lacerations from flying glass [31]. The 
red zone includes the intermediate road and a small part of the canteen. The yellow 
zone is wide and includes intermediate road, and some parts of the gym and canteen. 
There is a risk for personnel and students near this are.  
 
Figure 4.55 indicates the burning of propane as a jet fire. The burning of propane as a 
jet fire is simulated on the map for three different zones. The first zone is very 
dangerous because the thermal radiation is 10 KW/(sq m) and can result in death in 
60 seconds. This zone includes some part of the canteen, the parking area, and part of 
volleyball and mini football area. If there is a truck or car this can lead another 
explosion. The second zone is also dangerous in this area as thermal radiation is 5 
KW/(sq m) and can result in 2nd degree burns in 60 seconds. The third zone is less 
dangerous as thermal radiation is 2 KW/(sq m) and results in pain in 60 seconds. 
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Figure 4.54 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
 
Figure 4.55 : Chemical is Burning as a Jet Fire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6,9 Kpa – Shatters glass 
24,15 Kpa – Serious injury 
< 
 
10 kW/(sq m)–Potentially lethal in 60 sec 
5 kW/(sq m)–2nd Degree Burns in 60 sec 
2 kW/(sq m)–Pain in 60 sec 
1 
2 
3 
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Table 4.11 :  Human Injury Criteria (Includes Injury from Flying Glass and Direct Overpressure 
Effects) [45] 
Overpressure 
(kPa) Injury Comments Source 
4,14 
Threshold for injury from 
flying glass* Based on studies using sheep and dogs a 
6,9 - 13,8 
Threshold for skin laceration 
from flying glass Based on U.S. Army data b 
Threshold for multiple skin 
penetrations  
5,4 
from flying glass (bare 
skin)* Based on studies using sheep and dogs a  
Threshold for serious 
wounds from flying 
13,8 - 20,7 glass Based on U.S. Army data b  
16,56 
Threshold for eardrum 
rupture Conflicting data on eardrum rupture b 
19,32 
10% probability of eardrum 
rupture Conflicting data on eardrum rupture b 
One source suggested an overpressure 
20,7 
Overpressure will hurl a 
person to the ground of 1.0 psi for this effect c  
23,46 1% eardrum rupture Not a serious lesion d 
Serious wounds from flying 
glass near 50% 
27,6 - 34,5 probability Based on U.S. Army data b  
Threshold for body-wall 
penetration from 
40,02 flying glass (bare skin)* Based on studies using sheep and dogs a  
43,47 
50% probability of eardrum 
rupture Conflicting data on eardrum rupture b 
Serious wounds from flying 
glass near 100% 
48,3 - 55,2 probability Based on U.S. Army data b  
Not a serious lesion [applies to a blast 
of long duration (over 50 m/sec)]; 
20–30 psi required for 3 m/sec 
69 Threshold lung hemorrhage duration waves d 
 
Fatality primarily from lung 
100,05 
Fatality threshold for direct 
blast effects hemorrhage b  
Some of the ear injuries would be 
110,4 50% eardrum rupture severe d  
10% probability of fatality 
from direct blast  effects 
120,75 
 
Conflicting data on mortality b 
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Table 4.11 :  Human Injury Criteria (Includes Injury from Flying Glass and Direct Overpressure Effects) 
[45] 
Overpressure 
(kPa) Injury Comments Source 
50% probability of fatality 
from direct blast b 
141,45 effects Conflicting data on mortality   
90% probability of fatality 
from direct blast 
175,95 effects Conflicting data on mortality b  
A high incidence of severe lung injuries 
[applies to a blast of long duration 
(over 50 m/sec)]; 60–70 psi required 
186,3 1% mortality for 3 m/sec duration waves d 
 
99% probability of fatality 
from direct blast 
200,1 effects Conflicting data on mortality b 
     
For SI units, 6.9 kPa = 1 psi.  
*Interpretation of tables of data presented in reference. 
aFletcher, Richmond, and Yelverron, 1980. 
bF. Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 1996. 
cBrasie and Simpson, 1968.  
dU.S. Department of Transportation, 1988. 
 
 
4.3 Over Pressure and Effects for Case -1  
 
In this section of case-1 the blast area of a vapour cloud explosion was simulated for 
14 different over pressure values. The program plotted the graph and also gave the 
results in a text format, where the maximum distance for simulated overpressure is 
written. In all cases, it is assumed that the time of the vapour cloud ignition was not 
known, it was ignited by a flame or spark and the level of congestion is defined as 
“congested”.    
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Figure 4.56: Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion  
 
 
Figure 4.57 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion  
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Figure 4.58 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
Figure 4.56 indicates a red zone is as large as 60 meters wherein the overpressure is 
6.9 kPa; the orange zone is as large as 86 meters wherein overpressure is 4.14 kPa; 
the yellow zone is as large as 98 meters with an overpressure of 3.45 kPa. 
 
Figure 4.57 indicates that the red zone is as large as 43 meters with an overpressure 
of 15.87 kPa; the orange zone is as large as 45 meters with an overpressure of 
13.8kPa and the yellow zone is as large as 49 meters with an overpressure of 10.35 
kPa. 
 
Figure 4.58 indicates a red zone is as large as 39 meters wherein the overpressure is 
23.46 kPa; the orange zone is as large as 40 meters wherein the overpressure is 20.7 
kPa; the yellow zone is as large as 42 meters wherein the overpressure is 17.25 kPa. 
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Figure 4.59 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
 
 
Figure 4.60 : Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
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Figure 4.59 indicates that the red zone is as large as 38 meters within overpressure of 
34.5 kPa; the orange zone is as large as 38 meters wherein overpressure is 33.12 kPa; 
the yellow zone is as large as 39 meters wherein the overpressure is 27.6 kPa. 
 
Figure 4.59 indicates that the red zone never grows where the overpressure is 34.5 
kPa; the orange zone never grows where the overpressure is 33.12 kPa; and the 
yellow zone is as large as 37 meters where overpressure is at 27.6 kPa. 
 
Table 4.12 : Overpressure- maximum distance 
 
Overpressure 
(Kpa) 
Maximum Distance 
(meter) 
3,45 98 
4,14 86 
6,9 60 
10,35 49 
13,8 45 
15,87 43 
17,25 42 
20,7 40 
23,46 39 
27,6 39 
33,12 38 
34,5 38 
40,02 37 
41,4 -- 
55,2 -- 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Explosion modelling is very important for plant design. According to the materials 
which will be produced in the plant or the materials which will be used in the plant 
and their quantity, explosion modelling should be done before adding a new facility 
or for plant optimization. Also it is very important in new plant design; according to 
the simulation results, the location of facility and alternative input materials can be 
determined.  
 
Another area where explosion modelling is useful is in risk management. In many 
kinds of risk management the results from explosion modelling can be used. Risk 
management should include some physical data, and for explosion modelling it is 
very hard to do calculations manually. With regard to this requirement an appropriate 
software can be used.  
 
The simulation result of the LPG filling station showed that the location of the 
buildings was done logically, especially in the location of the management and social 
facilities buildings and the filling house. 
 
Mitigation is very significant topic in all types of industrial accidents. In case of an 
explosion, damage should be minimized to the environment, buildings and humans. 
To minimize hazards, mitigation studies should be done for plants and buildings. 
With regard to explosions there should be appropriate explosion modelling and, 
according to these results, mitigation of damage to the environment, buildings and 
humans can be done. For example, using some kind of panel or removing some 
material from the working area can reduce the effects of an explosion. 
 
Explosion modelling can be used in damage assessment. On the market there are 
many powerful tools for the estimation of damage to property and human life. These 
tools can be used to get accurate results for damage assessment in explosions. 
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Disaster planning is another area where explosion modelling can be used. It is 
important to have a disaster plan and to know the worst case and to take some action 
and make prevention plans for that situation. 
 
After an explosion it is very hard to assess what exactly happen and why it happened. 
In this field explosion modelling can be used for accident investigation and for the 
assessment of what questions are appropriate. For example, what kind of cloud, the 
diameter of the cloud, concentration and so forth.  
 
Explosion modelling is very useful to determining safe distances inside and outside 
of plants. By using simulation tools these areas can be determined and, in case of any 
disaster, these areas can be used as a refuge. So, in this way, chaos will be prevented 
because every one will know that if there is an accident, they should go to these 
safety areas. 
 
Further, CFD code for can be used for simulation and multi scenarios can be 
modelled together. 
 
During the research stage of this study much communication was done with a 
software supplier, all of them are of foreign origin. Many of the suppliers refused to 
send their software for academic research; some of them said that the software can be 
used for academic purposes only in their own country. So with this study, explosion 
models are summarized and the next step, according to the current situation and 
future trends is for a national code to be established. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
English  Turkish 
 
  
Explosion : Patlama 
Gas Explosion : Gaz patlaması 
Dust Explosion : Toz patlaması 
Confined : Sınırlı, kapalı, kuşatılmış 
Unconfined : Kuşatılmamış 
Blast : Patlamadan sonraki yıkıcı hava dalgası 
Overpressure : Aşırı basınç, fazla basınç 
Buoyant : Yüzen 
Dispersion : Dağılma, yayılma 
Spill : Dökmek, dökülmek 
Mitigation : Zarar azaltma 
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